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Regulation of Trading in Ginnie Maes
Sam Scott Miller*
The Housing and Urban Development Act of 19681 provided au-
thority for the Government National Mortgage Association
(GNMA) to guarantee securities backed by pools of mortgages in-
sured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) or Farmers
Home Administration or guaranteed by the Veterans Administra-
tion (VA).2 Guarantees issued pursuant to this authority are
backed by the full faith and credit of the United States.'
* Mr. Miller, a member of the New York Bar and a graduate of the Yale and Tulane
law schools, is General Counsel of Paine Webber Incorporated, a financial services holding
company, and Visiting Lecturer at the Yale Law School.
Note: Subsequent to completion of this article, legislation was enacted that implements
that part of the jurisdictional accord reached between the Chairmen of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) in-
volving changes in the securities laws. This legislation, H.R. 6156, confirms SEC jurisdiction
regarding options on securities. See text accompanying notes 108-28. (Shortly after enact-
ment of the legislation, the SEC approved rule changes that permitted the Chicago Board
Options Exchange and the American Stock Exchange to begin trading of options on Trea-
sury securities. Exch. Act Release Nos. 19,125-34 (Oct. 14, 1982), and the Supreme Court
vacated the Court of Appeals decision in Board of Trade v. SEC. See Chicago Bd. Options
Exch., Inc. v. Board of Trade of Chicago, 51 U.S.L.W. 3403, 3405 (U.S. Nov. 30, 1982),
vacating as moot 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982); see text accompanying notes 26-34). The
jurisdictional accord cannot be fully implemented, however, until amendments are made to
the Commodity Exchange Act. These amendments are included in the CFTC Reauthoriza-
tion Bill (H.R. 5447), but Congress has not yet taken action on this bill..
1. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448; 82 Stat. 476
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15, 18, 20, 31, 38, 40, 42, and 49 U.S.C.).
2. National Housing Act § 306, 12 U.S.C. § 1721(g) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Regula-
tions under this section are found at 24 C.F.R. § 390 (1982). Additional requirements for
issuers of these securities are set forth in the U.S. DEP'T OF Hous. AN URBAN DEv., PuB. No.
GNMA 5500.1 Rzv-5, GOVERNMENT NATIONAL MORTGAGE AsSOCIATION MORTGAGE-BACKED
SEcuaRis GumE (June 1980) [hereinafter cited as the GNMA GumE].
3. Letter from William H. Rehnquist, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Jus-
tice, to George Romney, Secretary, Department of Housing and Urban Development (Dec.
9, 1969). GNMA, in its corporate capacity under § 306, 12 U.S.C. § 1721(g) (1976 & Supp.
IV 1980) of the National Housing Act, may issue to the United States Treasury its general
obligations in an amount sufficient to enable GNMA to carry out its "management and
liquidating functions," including the obligation to guarantee the timely payment of the prin-
cipal and interest on mortgage-backed securities, with no limitation as to amount. The
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As Congress intended 4 the mortgage-backed securities program
has attracted private capital into the housing industry from insti-
tutions that traditionally had not invested in mortgages.6  By
purchasing these securities, which are commonly called "Ginnie
Maes," managers of investment portfolios of financial institutions,
pension funds, trusts and other large investors obtain for their ac-
counts the investment results of a portfolio of mortgage loans on
geographically diverse residential real estate without the cumber-
some and expensive requirements of acquisition, servicing and su-
pervision ordinarily associated with these loans.6 Moreover, be-
cause of the government guarantee, Ginnie Maes are legal
investments in many cases where corporate bonds are not. Ginnie
Maes generally offer the best yields of actively traded United
States government securities and are easily marketed and trans-
ferred. Investor reception of Ginnie Maes has been spectacular:
more than $100 billion principal amount have been issued.7
Treasury is authorized and has undertaken to purchase any obligations so issued. Letter
from David M. Kennedy, Secretary of the Treasury, to George Romney, Secretary of Hous-
ing and Urban Development (Feb. 13, 1970). See 12 U.S.C. § 1721(g) (1976 & Supp. IV
1980).
4. H.R. REP. No. 1585, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 2945, reprinted in 1968 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 2873. See also In re SSIW Corp., 7 Bankr. 735, 737 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
5. New investors included chiefly pension funds and credit unions. PUBLIC SEC. ASS'N,
REPORT ON THE GNMA SECURITIES MARKET 16 (1978). See generally, Sivesind, Mortgage-
Backed Securities: The Revolution in Real Estate Finance, 4 FED. RES. BANK OF N.Y. Q.
REV. 1 (1979).
6. G. OSBORNE, G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW 666 (1979);
GOVERNMENT NAT'L MORTGAGE Ass'N, ANNUAL REPORT 8 (1976).
7. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON Hous., REPORT 113, 166 (1982); Buckley, There Is
No Mortgage Problem, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1980, at F-3. Primary offerings increased from
a volume of $376 million in 1970 to more than $24 billion in 1979. COMMODITY EXCH. INC.,
GNMA CERTIFICATE FUTURES CONTRACTS 9 (1980). GNMA mortgage-backed securities
financed over half the FHA and VA loans originated in 1978. Sivesind, supra note 5, at 4.
Thus, the GNMA mortgage-backed securities program has become one of the most impor-
tant sources of single-family mortgage credit. See generally, Vasquez & Levin, The Future
of the Secondary Market for Home Mortgages, in THE FUTURE OF THE FINANCIAL SERVICES
INDUSTRY (1982) (prepared by the Hudson Institute). The Reagan Administration, however,
has imposed severe commitment limitations on the program. See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, MAJOR THEMES AND ADDITIONAL BUDGET
DETAILS (FISCAL YEAR 1983) (1982); see also THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON HoUs., REPORT 167
(1982).
Mortgage-backed securities are also issued by the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corpo-
ration (Freddie Macs) and private issuers (Connie Macs). Privately issued mortgage-backed
securities, closely patterned on the modified pass-through Ginnie Maes, met with instant
public acceptance. Ginnie Mae's Kid Sister, Privately-Insured Mortgage Pass-Throughs
Score on Wall Street, Barron's, Nov. 14, 1977, at 3. Since roughly 80% 'of mortgage origina-
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Unfortunately episodic scandals have erupted in the trading
markets for these instruments. Awful losses sustained by banks,
thrift institutions, mortgage bankers and university funds, exacer-
bated by volatile swings in interest rates and in some cases abetted
by improper sales practices of dealers, have attracted intense scru-
tiny by regulators. Some have reacted with grandiose schemes of
governing the Ginnie Mae markets; at the same time, they appear
to have dealt adequately with identified abuses by bringing to bear
existing remedies, chiefly the anti-fraud rules, and by designing
more limited regulatory constraints for particular classes of partici-
pants in these markets. Moreover, dealers have formed a self-regu-
latory organization that has promulgated prophylactic rules and, in
individual cases, have begun to require margin, thus inhibiting
speculative abuses. Of the greatest significance, discerning regula-
tors have recognized that accounting rules that require immediate
recognition of losses are the most effective as well as the simplest
discipline for participants.
This article will describe the problems that emerged in the bur-
geoning Ginnie Mae markets and analyze the responses to these
problems by regulators and participants. To better understand
these problems and responses, we shall first look at what Ginnie
Maes are, the forms by which they are bought and sold, the mar-
kets in which they are traded and legal principles that have been
applied to these instruments, forms and markets.
I. DESCRIPTION
Each GNMA certificate represents a pro rata share in an under-
lying pool of mortgages, the aggregate unpaid principal balance of
which is equal to the aggregate amount of the particular issue of
Ginnie Maes. Interest on the security is fixed .5% below the inter-
est rate on mortgages in the pool. This differential goes to the orig-
inator of the security for servicing (.44%) and payment of the an-
nual guaranty fee of GNMA (.06%). In return for the servicing fee,
tions consist of conventional mortgages, there is an enormous potential market in conven-
tional pass-throughs. Marcis, The Conventional Pass-Through Security: A Star Is Born,
THE REAL EST. Rav. 59 (1979). Although they are considered safe investments, they provide
a slightly higher yield than Ginnie Maes because of the lack of a federal guaranty. For a
comprehensive description of the various kinds of mortgage-backed securities, see Strine,




the originator (or other servicer if the right is assigned) must ser-
vice loans in the pool, distribute monthly payments of principal
and interest to security holders and handle any delinquencies and
foreclosures.
There are three basic types of Ginnie Maes: straight pass-
throughs, modified pass-throughs and bonds. In straight pass-
throughs, GNMA guarantees the timely payment of principal and
interest as it is collected. In modified pass-throughs, GNMA guar-
antees the timely payment of interest and principal based on the
amortization schedules of the underlying mortgage pools, whether
or not collected. In both types of pass-through securities, payments
and proceeds of foreclosure are passed through to the security
holders. The bond-type securities provide semi-annual interest
payments and periodic redemptions and are subject to call. Issues
of straight pass-through and bond-type securities have been rela-
tively insignificant.8 The vast majority of outstanding Ginnie Maes
are modified pass-throughs based on pools of single-family homes,
and we shall here deal exclusively with these securities.
GNMA prepares the certificates for these securities,9 which are
issued in minimum denominations of $25,000 and in $5,000 incre-
ments (although most Ginnie Maes trade in institutional sizes of
$1 million or more). While the issuer must make monthly pay-
ments of interest and principal to registered holders of these secur-
ities, it is not otherwise obligated to the holders. 10 The only varia-
ble among issues is the constitution of the individual pools of
mortgages.
A high degree of fungibility is achieved through the requirement
that all mortgages in a particular pool be homogeneous." Under
these requirements, a pool may contain only single-family mort-
gages (on one-to-four family properties); all mortgages must bear
8. GNMA MORTGAGE-BACKED Szc. DEALERs Ass'N, THE GINNIE MAE MANUAL 23 (1978)
[hereinafter cited as the DEALERs' MANUAL]. GNMA may also guarantee serial issues of
mortgage-backed securities, as well as construction loan certificates, project loans and mo-
bile home loans. Id. at 24-25.
9. The certificates are freely negotiable by means of an assignment form on the back
of the certificate or a special TreasUry Department form, PD-1832. See In re Legel, Braswell
Gov't See., 648 F.2d 321 (5th Cir. 1981). Ginnie Maes are investment securities under U.C.C.
§ 8-102(1)(a). First Nat'l Bank v. Jefferson Mortgage Co., 576 F.2d 479, 485 (3d Cir. 1978).
10. The issuer must be a mortgagee approved by the FHA and must meet GNMA
requirements covering business procedures and controls, reporting and minimum net worth.
See the description of the primary market and issuers infra pt. III.
11. GNMA GUIDE, supra note 2, at para. 3.3.
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the same rate of interest; and mortgages in the pool must have
been insured or guaranteed within the year preceding the date of
GNMA's commitment to guarantee the pool.12 Because of these re-
quirements, together with level monthly amortization requirements
of the underlying mortgages, investors generally treat Ginnie Maes
bearing the same rate of interest as fungible.'"
12. GNMA GUIDE, supra note 2, at paras. 3.2 and 3.
13. In accordance with standard provisions of FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed mort-
gages, each is required to be amortized by level monthly payments applied first to interest
on the unpaid principal balance on the loan and next to principal on the loan. Scheduled
payments of principal and interest are relatively uniform, although these are supplemented
by prepayments of mortgages in the underlying pool.
Prepayments ordinarily result when a mortgage is refinanced or goes into default. Each
loan may be prepaid in whole or in part at any time. In the event of prepayment by the
mortgagor (borrower), no redemption premium is payable to the mortgagee (lender); al-
though in the case of FHA-insured loans, when more than 15% of the unpaid principal
balance is prepaid within any year during the first 10 years, a 1% prepayment premium of
the mortgage is payable to FHA.
Experience indicates that the average life of mortgages insured or guaranteed by the
government is 12 years. See U.S. DEPT. OF TREASURY, FEDERAL RESERVE SYS., AND SEC, RE-
PORT OF THE JOINT STUDY OF THE GOVERNMENT-RELATED SECURITIES MARKETS 69 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as TRI-AGENCY STUDY]. Because of this experience, yields on Ginnie Maes
are commonly quoted on a 12-year average life as well as on a 30-year yield-to-maturity
basis. PUBLIC SEC. Ass'N, UNIFORM PRACTICES FOR THE CLEARANCE AND SETTLEMENT OF
MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES 14 (1981). Pools containing mortgages from certain parts of
the country may vary from this norm. For example, pools of mortgages from California and
the Southwest are believed to have shorter average lives. 1 U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. AND URBAN
DEV., Gov'T NAT'L MORTGAGE Ass'N, ANALYSIS AND REPORT ON ALTERNATIVE APPROXCHES TO
REGULATING THE TRADING OF GNMA SECURITIES 5 (1978) (prepared by R. Shriver Associ-
ates, a private consulting firm) [hereinafter cited as the GNMA REPORT]. Recent high inter-
est rates have caused homeowners to be reluctant to prepay their lower-rate mortgages,
however, thus increasing the average life. Quint, Pass-Through Securities, N.Y. Times, Dec.
19, 1981, at 34.
In July, 1980, PSA Self-Regulation, Inc. filed suit against GNMA after problems with
customers experienced by securities dealers in marketing Ginnie Mas backed by so-called
builder loans (FHA-insured loans made to builders to finance unsold inventory). The law
suit was settled with an agreement by GNMA to disclose information to dealers identifying
pools guaranteed prior to September 1, 1980, that contained builder loans. The information
was regarded as significant because of the rapid pay down expected with such loans. PUBLIC
SEC. ASs'N, ANNUAL REPORT 9 (1980). Moreover, GNMA recently announced that partial
buydown loans, for which the home seller provides funds to reduce the home buyer's mort-
gage interest payments during the early term of the loan, may not be included in Ginnie
Mae pools, "at least for the time being." Memorandum from Fred Taylor, Executive Vice
President, GNMA, to participants in the GNMA Mortgage-Backed Securities Program (July
24, 1981). Subsequently, GNMA announced plans to place such buydown loans in separate
pools, thus creating a new kind of Ginnie Mae. GNMA to Create Pools Backed by Buydown
Loans, SECURITIEs WEEK, Aug. 31, 1981, at 2. Presumably these actions were taken in re-
sponse to concerns about faster pay downs of such mortgages because of higher delinquen-
cies. The standard prospectus required by GNMA for single-family securities does not pro-
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II. FORMS OF TRANSACTIONS
Transactions in Ginnie Maes take diverse forms, including im-
mediate-delivery contracts, delayed-delivery contracts, various op-
tional-delivery arrangements and repurchase agreements. In addi-
tion, futures contracts in Ginnie Maes are traded on boards of
trade regulated by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission
(CFTC).
A. Immediate-Delivery Contracts
Contracts for immediate delivery account for a relatively small
proportion of all transactions in Ginnie Maes. Similar to "regular-
way" transactions in the equity markets, these contracts are
formed in the "immediate cash market" and generally settle within
thirty business days of trade date. A purchaser would seldom be
speculating on interest-rate swings during this brief period or an-
ticipate not taking delivery. Accordingly, trading abuses have sel-
dom occurred in connection with immediate-delivery contracts, but
have generally taken place in respect of delayed-delivery contracts
involving prolonged periods between trade date and settlement
date.
B. Delayed-Delivery Contracts
Most transactions in Ginnie Maes are for delayed delivery, re-
flecting the housing cycle."' The developer of a housing tract must
usually obtain a commitment for permanent mortgage financing in
order to obtain a construction loan as well as to facilitate sales of
the housing units. The mortgage banker who provides the commit-
ment is vulnerable to the risk of a negative shift in interest rates
during the several months that it takes him to originate and pool
mortgages for sale, obtain the approval and guaranty of GNMA
and issue Ginnie Mae certificates for sale. He may avoid this risk
and lock in his interest cost by selling the mortgages, or more eas-
ily, Ginnie Maes forward for mandatory delivery or for optional
delivery pursuant to a stand-by arrangement.' 6 Indeed, the com-
vide for disclosure concerning particular mortgages in a pool. GNMA GuIDE, supra note 2,
app. at 20.
14. TsI-AGENCY STUDY, supra note 13, at 37-42.
15. Department of Labor, Proposed Amendments to Prohibited Transaction Exemp-
tion 81-7 for Certain Transactions Involving Mortgage Pool Investment Trusts, Supp. Infor-
Vol. 21:39
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mercial bank which generally provides the mortgage banker with
short-term financing to meet the commitment to the developer
may insist upon such a forward sale for security.
In addition to these market reasons, cash management consider-
ations have favored delayed-delivery instruments. An investor who
can project the need for, or availability of, cash several months in
the future can lock in a current yield by selling short or buying
long for delayed delivery. For example, during a period of rising
interest rates (and falling bond prices), an investor may sell securi-
ties which he owns for delayed delivery, thereby stopping a loss on
Ginnie Maes which might have to be sold at lower prices in the
future. Forward contracts also provide a means of speculation to
persons who do not intend to acquire the underlying securities.
Speculators provide a link between mortgage bankers originating
loans and investors who may not be willing to anticipate future
cash flow.
These contracts provide for the purchase and sale of Ginnie
Maes at a future date for a stated price and yield, although they
usually allow substitution of a security bearing a different coupon
so long as the yield to expected maturity is equivalent to the stated
yield. Delayed-delivery contracts are typically formed orally, fol-
lowed by written confirmation on a "firm," as opposed to a "when,
as and if issued," basis. The contract terms include the approxi-
mate face amount of the securities to be delivered, the interest
rate, the yield and a delivery date, usually three to six months in
the future. These transactions are sometimes called "TBAs" (to be
announced), because on the trade date GNMA pool numbers and
the coupon interest rate have not been announced for these securi-
ties and thus cannot yet be assigned to transactions. They are also
referred to as "forwards" (which term is also applied to the stand-
by arhngements discussed below), "mandatories" and, Occasion-
ally, "when issueds." Sellers have not historically required any
payment by buyers at the time of contract for delayed delivery,
although some dealers are now demanding margin based on the
difference between the contract value of the underlying security
and its current market."
mation pt. B (May 13, 1982), see 47 Fed. Reg. 21,325, 21,327 (1982).
16. Like futures markets but unlike securities markets, margin provided to a dealer in
respect of a forward contract is a guarantee of performance or earnest money, not a down




In a stand-by arrangement one party pays a non-refundable
commitment fee for the right to deliver a specified amount of Gin-
nie Maes to the other party on a certain date at a stated price
(generally at or near the market price at the time of entering the
stand-by contract) and fixed yield.1 7 Thus the party paying the fee
is essentially purchasing a "put" option. If interest rates fall after
trade date, the price of the Ginnie Maes will rise; accordingly the
purchaser of the stand-by will not exercise its option to deliver and
the seller will retain the fee. If interest rates rise after the trade
date, the price of the Ginnie Maes will fall; therefore the purchaser
will deliver Ginnie Maes at the contract price rather than sell them
into a declining market. In some cases the stand-by may be
"paired off" with another forward contract for the same settlement
date so that the loss is fixed. Typically, stand-bys are written for a
period of one year, but a shorter or longer period may be
negotiated.
Although mortgage bankers usually initiate these transactions,
investors may use stand-bys as one method of fixing the return on
securities owned and stopping loss in the event of market decline.
Those issuing the commitments can, if they successfully predict in-
terest rate movements, earn commitment fees without invest-
ment.18 However, losses may be well in excess of the commitment
fees received if interest rates move adversely.
D. Repurchase Agreements
A repurchase agreement comprises two simultaneous transac-
tions, one of which is an agreement to sell, for immediate payment
(1971).
17. The agreement to sell securities with optional delivery is a purchase of a stand-by
commitment, and the agreement to purchase securities on that basis is the sale of a stand-
by commitment.
18. Some thrift institutions may have predicated their investment decisions on the
ability to record commitment fees as current income. Federal Home Loan Bank Board Reso-
lution No. 79-295, 44 Fed. Reg. 29,867 (1979) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 563.17-3 (1982)). This
temptation appears to have been removed for savings and loan associations insured by the
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation by a rule that effectively requires such
associations to amortize such fees in excess of direct underwriting costs over the combined
terms of the commitment and the security. 12 C.F.R. § 563.17-3(f) (1982); AMERICAN INST.




and delivery, securities at a specified price, and the other of which
is an agreement to repurchase the same securities at a future date
for that price plus an increment representing interest. The initial
seller (or borrower) generally retains the right to receive interest
and principal payments on the underlying securities. For the pur-
chaser (or lender), such agreements are called reverse repurchase
agreements. Possession of the securities may or may not actually
be transferred, depending on the length of the contract term and
the relationship of the parties involved. Repurchase agreements
are in form agreements for the simultaneous purchase and sale of
securities, but in some cases they are considered collateralized
loans and regulated as such.' Although these arrangements tradi-
tionally have been documented simply with purchase and sale con-
firmations, some securities dealers have begun to utilize written
agreements which define the rights and duties of the parties.
Repurchase agreements are sometimes used to finance the
purchase of other interest-bearing securities. The purchaser of
Ginnie Maes might enter into a repurchase agreement with the
seller, applying the proceeds obtained to the purchase price of the
underlying securities. Holders of securities also enter into repur-
chase agreements to obtain funds to purchase other securities the
yield of which is expected to exceed the effective cost of the repur-
chase agreement. Moreover, they may avoid taking capital losses
on the securities that are the subjects of the repurchase agree-
ments. Securities dealers, mortgage bankers and thrift institutions
use repurchase agreements for short-term financing.20
19. See generally In re Legel, Braswell Gov't Sec., 648 F.2d 321, 324 n.5 (5th Cir.
1981); U.S. v. Erickson, 601 F.2d 296, 300 n.4 (7th Cir. 1979); SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp.
465, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 1980); Ehrlich-Bober v. University of Houston, 49 N.Y.2d 574, 577
(1980).
For tax purposes, repurchase agreements have been generally deemed loans. See, e.g.,
First American Nat'l Bank v. United States, 467 F.2d 1098 (6th Cir. 1972); Union Planters
Nat'l Bank v. United States, 426 F.2d 115 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 827 (1970). But
cf. Citizens Nat'l Bank v. United States, 551 F.2d 832 (Ct.CI. 1977). The Comptroller of the
Currency, on the other hand, treats repurchase transactions by national banks as purchases
and sales that are not subject to limitations on borrowing and lending, 12 C.F.R. § 7.1131
(1982). Repurchase obligations with respect to government securities are excluded from de-
posits for purposes of computing reserve requirements by the Federal Reserve Board, 12
C.F.R. § 217.1(0(2) (1982), the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 12 C.F.R. §
329.10(b)(2) (1982), and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, 12 C.F.R. § 531.12 (1982).
Similarly, deposit interest-rate restrictions are not generally applicable to such repurchase
agreements. 12 C.F.R. §§ 217, 329 and 526 (1982).
20. See Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, Exch. Act Release No.
1982
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Reverse repurchase agreements provide a method of investing
short-term funds without being at the risk of the market.2 These
arrangements can be negotiated to meet individual needs, and vary
in length from one day to six months or even longer. Dealers fre-
quently match a repurchase agreement with a reverse repurchase
agreement, for which they are compensated by a differential be-
tween the rates on the two transactions.
E. Swaps
A swap is the sale of one security and simultaneous purchase of
another. Yield-curve variations may make it advantageous to move
out of one issue into another. Investors may also wish to realize
gains or losses for tax purposes.
F. Futures
Futures contracts are agreements to make or take delivery of
Ginnie Mae certificates under standard terms and conditions. Ap-
proved by the CFTC for futures trading22 in response to the sub-
stantial volatility of interest rates in recent years, these contracts
are bought and sold through a competitive auction process on cen-
tralized, self-regulated boards of trade overseen by the CFTC. The
Ginnie Mae futures contract provides market participants such as
mortgage bankers additional means of transferring the risk of in-
terest-rate fluctuation to speculators who are willing to bear the
risk in anticipation of realizing profits. Ginnie Mae futures can
therefore be used to hedge market positions, much as contracts for
delayed delivery.23 Futures contracts have not replaced delayed-de-
livery contracts as a means for mortgage bankers to hedge their
positions, in part because trading volume has been too light to en-
able a mortgage banker to hedge in volume.24 Also, unlike forward
18,418 (Jan. 13, 1982). Securities sold by broker-dealers under repurchase agreements aggre-
gated $34.9 billion, representing 34% of their liabilities, at the end of 1980. SECURITIES AND
EXCH. COMM'N, STAFF REPORT ON THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY IN 1980, at 63 (Sept. 1981).
21. Securities purchased by broker-dealers under agreements to resell aggregated $32.8
billion at year-end 1980, representing 30% of their total assets. SECURITIES AND EXCH.
COMM'N, STAFF REPORT ON THE SECURITIES INDUSTRY IN 1980, at 63 (Sept. 1981).
22. Order of CFTC, In re Bd. of Trade (Sept. 11, 1975).
23. See Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982); CHICAGO BD. OF TRADE,
HEDGING INTEREST RATE RISKS 2-3, 13-17 (1977).
24. In addition, delivery under the original contract of the Chicago Board of Trade
was made by means of a rather cumbersome instrument known as a due bill. Settlement
Vol. 21:39
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trading, trading in futures requires a trader to put up margin
(whereas the purchase of a Ginnie Mae on a delayed-delivery basis
traditionally has not involved an immediate outlay) and abide by
complex rules and reporting requirements. Moreover, futures con-
tracts call for delivery of fixed amounts on specified delivery dates
and may not fit a mortgage banker's schedule. On the other hand,
while forward contracts seldom exceed six months in duration,
some futures contracts trade for delivery up to two-and-a-half
years in the future, thus allowing long-range protection to a
hedger.2"
G. Options
Although the Chicago Board Options Exchange (CBOE) had re-
ceived approval from the Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) of a proposal for exchange trading of options on Ginnie
Maes, 2 and the New York Stock Exchange had submitted a simi-
lar proposal,27 these proposals have been blocked, at least for the
time being, by the recent decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit in Board of Trade v. SEC28 holding that such op-
tions fall within the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction under the Com-
modity Exchange Act.29 If permitted, these options would serve
functions similar to the other optional commitments described
above,30 although the exchange markets would be characterized by
procedures now provide for delivery of newly issued Ginnie Mae certificates to the commod-
ities exchange clearinghouse. See Ganis, Cash Market or Futures Market. Which One is
Best for Mortgage Bankers, 39 MORTGAGE BANKE 7 (1978).
25. Id.
26. In re Chicago Bd. of Options Exch., Inc., Exch. Act Release No. 17,577 (Feb. 26,
1981); see also In re Chicago Bd. of Options Exch., Inc., Exch. Act Release No. 17,005 (July
24, 1980); In re Chicago Bd. of Options Exch., Inc., Exch. Act Release No. 16,801 (May 12,
1980), 43 Fed. Reg. 32,458 (1978). These options would be for units of $100,000 remaining
principal balance of Ginnie Maes, with coupons priced to a yield equivalent based on the
standard assumption of prepayment in the twelfth year. Thus the delivery obligation would
be satisfied by tendering Ginnie Maes within a range of coupons adjusted in value to main-
tain yield equivalence. CHICAGO BD. OF OPTIONS EXCH., A MARKET IN OPTIONS ON GNMA
MODIFIED PAss-THROUGH SECURITIES 1 (1980).
27. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., Exch. Act
Release No. 17,578 (Feb. 26, 1981).
28. 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982). The court also found that the SEC had lacked juris-
diction to approve the CBOE proposal. Id. at 1155-61.
29. 7 U.S.C. § 2 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
30. In CFTC v. United States Metal Depository Co., 468 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D.N.Y.
1979), the court distinguished options from futures contracts and margin sales as follows: (i)
1982
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uniform standards for customer suitability and surveillance of sales
practices."1 Moreover, the CBOE would establish minimum margin
requirements, thereby providing a disincentive to the over-commit-
ments that have caused problems in existing Ginnie Mae mar-
kets.3 2 In addition, exchange members in this market would deal
directly with the CBOE's clearing corporation, whose commitment
is backed by margin and capital requirements of clearing members,
customer margin and a clearing fund. 3 Finally, standardization of
terms would make option contracts fungible and hence remove im-
pediments to secondary trading.
3 4
the initial charge for an option contract is a non-refundable premium covering the seller's
commission and costs by contrast with a down payment paid in a futures or margin con-
tract; (ii) the purchaser of an option contract has the right but is not obligated to take
possession of the commodity, as is the purchaser of a futures contract; and (iii) the pur-
chaser of an options contract receives a profit only if the price of the underlying commodity
rises enough to cover the premium and fees and only stands to lose such premium and fees,
whereas the futures or margin buyer profits if the sales price exceeds the purchase price but
suffers loss otherwise. See also CFTC v. Goldex Int'l Ltd., [1977-80 Transfer Binder] COMM.
Fur. L. REP. (CCH) V 20,839 (N.D. Ill. May 17, 1979) and CFTC v. Morgan, Harris & Scott
Ltd., 484 F. Supp. 669 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), where courts found purported delayed-delivery con-
tracts to be commodity options, and Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d at 1151-52 n.28.
.31. See, e.g., CHICAGO BD. OF OPTIONS EXCH., A MARKET IN OPTIONS ON GNMA MOm-
FIED PASS-THROUGH SECURITIES 4 (1980). The CBOE has proposed an expansion of routine
reporting requirements of market makers in Ginnie Mae options to cover all accounts in
which they engage in futures and forward trading of Ginnie Maes. Proposed CBOE rule
20.30, File No. SR-CBOE-81-2; see generally 46 Fed. Reg. 27,430, 27,435 (1981) (exchange
proposals to trade options on United States Treasury securities); Exchange Act, §§ 6(b)(1)
and (5).
32. CBOE (CCH) rule 20.2.4. Under federal margin regulations, margin required for
writing uncovered options on debt securities guaranteed by government entities is deter-
mined by the, rules of the applicable exchange, subject to SEC approval. 12 C.F.R. §§
220.4(i) and 220.8(b) and (j) (1982). Prior to adoption of these rules, the SEC proposed an
amendment to § 7(a) of the Exchange Act that "would extend, or otherwise clarify, margin
requirements to options and futures on exempt securities .... " Letter from Ralph C. Fer-
rara, General Counsel of the SEC, to Alfonse D'Amato, Chairman, United States Senate
Subcommittee on Securities (July 15, 1981). The SEC's proposal was apparently premised
on the lack of statutory authority for margin requirements with respect to exempt securities
(see infra text accompanying notes 67-68); however, the basis for adoption of the above
rules by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System was evidently that options
on such securities are separate securities. Cf. infra nn. 88-89 and accompanying text; but cf.
infra nn. 69-70, 85-87 and 90-91 and accompanying text; Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d at
1155-59.
33. CHICAGO BD. OF OPTIOSS EXCH., A MARKET IN OPTIONS ON GNMA MODIFIED PASS-
THROUGH SECURITIES 5 (1980).
34. Id. at 6.
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III. TRADING MARKETS
Having described the underlying Ginnie Mae instrument and
how it is traded, we shall now look at the markets for these trans-
actions and the participating issuers, dealers and investors.
A. Primary Market and Issuers
The primary market for Ginnie Maes consists of transactions of
original issuance, either on an immediate-delivery or forward-de-
livery basis. Mortgage bankers issue most Ginnie Maes, with the
bulk of the remainder originated by commercial banks and savings
and loan associations. 5 Mortgage bankers originate mortgages pri-
marily to add to their mortgage servicing portfolio and thereby
earn servicing fees. They then sell the mortgages, which may take
the form of a sale of Ginnie Maes. Although the original sale may
be made directly to investors, most are to dealers who then resell
the Ginnie Maes to investors.36
In order to issue Ginnie Maes, a mortgage banker must be an
FHA-approved mortgagee, i.e., approved by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development (HUD) as responsible and able
to service mortgages.3 7 As a condition to this approval, HUD re-
quires, among other things, minimum net worth, independent an-
nual audits, periodic examination of books and records and segre-
gation of deposits and mortgage payments.38
Issuers of Ginnie Maes must also meet minimum net worth re-
quirements and follow specified business practices.3 9 These include
the adoption of procedures to ascertain financial integrity of pur-
chasers, to coordinate commitments and confirm market positions
and to maintain competence and integrity of personnel. To assure
compliance, issuers must provide certain reports to and be subject
to audit by GNMA. 0
35. TRI-AGENCY STUDY, supra note 13, at 70-71.
36. TRI-AGENCY STUDY, supra note 13, at 35.
37. National Housing Act, § 203, 12 U.S.C. § 1709(b)(1) (1976). Mortgage bankers are
also subject to registration requirements in many states, GNMA REPORT, supra note 13, at
60, and more extensive regulations in a few. See, e.g., Afuz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 6-901-911
(1974 & Supp. 1982-83) and ILL. ANN. STAT. §§ 2301-2313 (Smith-Hurd 1981).
38. 24 C.F.R. § 203.4 (1982).
39. GNMA GUIDE, supra note 2, at paras. 2-2(0 and 2-5.
40. Id. at paras. 11-4 and 12-1.
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B. Secondary Market and Dealers
Secondary market transactions involve amounts less than the
original amounts of the securities, such differences representing
amounts amortized and prepaid since the original issuance as well
as accrued interest. These transactions may take any of the forms
described in the preceding section. Growth in the number of deal-
ers participating in this market has paralleled the increase in vol-
ume of Ginnie Maes issued. By 1978, approximately sixty firms
were actively trading Ginnie Maes,"4 with about twenty of these
accounting for most of the distribution and trading. 4 In addition,
a few firms act as brokers between dealers.
43
Those dealers who do not limit their activities to dealings in se-
curities exempted under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Ex-
change Act), which include United States government and United
States government-guaranteed securities," must register with the
SEC.45 Most of these dealers are members of National Association
of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) and some belong to national se-
curities exchanges. Registration with the SEC means, among other
things, compliance with the net capital rule 46 and record-keeping
and reporting requirements. 47 Registered dealers are subject to in-
spection 4 and, in cases of violations, disciplinary proceedings."
Membership in the NASD involves similar regulation, but trading
in exempt securities is excluded from the NASD's jurisdiction.50
The national securities exchanges are not so limited; indeed they
may be obliged to regulate those dealings. 5 A dealer which limits
its business to exempt securities (including affiliates of SEC-regis-
tered firms and members of the NASD and national securities ex-
41. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc., Inv. Co., Act Release No. 10,365 (Aug. 17, 1978).
42. TRI-AGENCY STUDY, supra note 13, at 35.
43. White, The Siren Call of Ginnie Maes, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR 81 (Dec. 1976).
44. Section 3(a)(12), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (Supp. IV 1980).
45. Section 15(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. 78o (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). The registration require-
ment excludes those dealers whose business is exclusively intrastate and who do not use
national securities exchanges. Id.
46. 17 C.F.R. § 240.15c3-1 (1982).
47. Section 17(a) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) (1976), and the rules there-
under, 17 C.F.R. § 240.17a-1 to -21 (1982).
48. Section 17(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(b) (1976).
49. Section 15(b)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(4) (1976).
50. Section 15A(f), 15 U.S.C. § 78o-3f (1976); art. I, § 4, NASD MANUAL (CCH) 2,004
(Mar. 1981).
51. Cf. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 353-57 (1973).
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changes) is not required to register under the Exchange Act,52 al-
though it may be required to register with certain state
commissions.58 Dealers which are banks are regulated by the rele-
vant federal state banking agencies54 but neither are subject to reg-
ulation under the Exchange Act 55 nor under most state securities
statutes.56
The anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts apply to transac-
tions in exempt securities, 57 including transactions effected by
dealers not registered under the Exchange Act.58 Under the anti-
fraud provisions, the shingle theory has evolved. This theory,
which holds that by doing business with the public a securities
firm represents impliedly that it will deal fairly with customers ac-
cording to the standards of the profession," is applicable to all
dealers.60 While it does not require that a dealer act as a fiduciary
in all dealings, special responsibilities are imposed when a firm
places itself in a position of trust and confidence with the cus-
tomer.6 ' High pressure sales techniques, sometimes characterized
as "boiler room" practices, are inconsistent with the obligation to
deal fairly with such a customer." This obligation also includes the
duty to ascertain that recommendations have an adequate and rea-
sonable basis's and a duty to disclose to the customer when securi-
ties are being bought and sold at prices not reasonably related to
52. See § 15(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. 78o (1976 & Supp. IV 1980); Collateral Inv. Co., no-action
letter, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 77,216 (avail. May 12, 1982).
53. See, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 359-e.3 (McKinney 1968); UNIF. SEc. ACT § 201(a),
7A U.L.A. 576 (1978).
54. For a comparison of this regulation with that of broker-dealers registered with the
SEC from the standpoint of investor protection, see SEcURITIES AND ExCH. COMM'N, FINAL
REPORT ON BANK SECURITIES AcTvrrms (June 30, 1977).
55. Banks are excluded from the definition of "broker," § 3(a)(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(4)
(1976), and "dealer," § 3(a)(5), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(5) (1976); dealer-banks are, however, sub-
ject to the general anti-fraud provisions of § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1976), and § 17(a) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q (1976).
56. See, e.g., UNIF. SEc. ACT § 401(c)(3), 7A U.L.A. 626 (1978).
57. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 9 (1971); SEC v.
Charles A. Morris & Assoc., 386 F. Supp. 1327, 1332-33 (W.D. Tenn. 1973).
58. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. at 10.
59. Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 436-37 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied,
321 U.S. 786 (1944).
60. Id.
61. Id.; see 5A JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RuLE 10b-5 § 210.03 (1980 rev. ed.).
62. See Berko v. SEC, 316 F.2d 137, 141 n.5 (2d Cir. 1963).





Investors in Ginnie Maes include savings and loan associations,
savings banks, retirement and pension funds, commercial banks,
credit unions and individuals.6 5 Investment partnerships of private
investors (sometimes called "hedge funds") and investment com-
panies, through which the public may participate, have also been
purchasers of Ginnie Maes. Because Ginnie Maes are issued in
minimum denominations of $25,000, the market is primarily
institutional.
IV. LEGAL STATUS
Now that we have traced the dynamics of the trading markets,
let us examine the legal context of Ginnie Maes under the federal
securities and commodities acts before addressing the concerns
that have arisen in these markets. While the status of the instru-
ment itself is clear, that of the various forward transactions has
been called into question by investors attempting to wiggle out of
bad deals and has been the cynosure of jurisdictional claims by
government agencies as well as by participants in the markets,
who, as might be expected, have invoked these claims to forward
their own ends.
A. Securities Acts
Because of the federal guarantee, the offer and sale of Ginnie
Maes is exempt from registration under the Securities Act of 1933
(Securities Act) pursuant to section 3(a)(2). e Since these securities
64. Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151-54 (1972).
65. DEALERS' MANUAL, supra note 8, at 41-61. For discussion of the regulation of inves-
tors, see infra pt. IV.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(2) (Supp. IV 1980); letter from Courtney Whitney, Jr., Chief
Counsel of Division of Corporation Finance of the SEC, to Woodward Kingman, President,
GNMA (Oct. 22, 1969); IDS Mortgage Corp. no-action letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 78,505 (avail. Nov. 29, 1971). See also § 304(a)(4) of Trust Inden-
ture Act of 1939, 15 U.S.C. § 77ddd(a)(4) (1976) (counterpart exemption). The statute creat-
ing GNMA also provides that securities issued thereunder are exempt under the federal
securities laws. 12 U.S.C. § 1723c (1976). This exemption attaches regardless whether the
securities are guaranteed by the government. Letter from Ezra Weiss, Chief Counsel of Divi-
sion of Trading and Markets of the SEC, to Woodward Kingman (Nov. 3, 1971).
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are also exempt under section 3(a)(12) of the Exchange Act,6 7 fed-
eral margin rules are not applicable and direct jurisdiction of the
SEC over transactions in Ginnie Maes is limited to the anti-fraud
provisions of the federal securities acts;68 nonetheless, that juris-
67. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (Supp. IV 1980).
68. See, e.g., §§ 10(b) and 15(c)(1) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78j(b) and
78o(c)(1) (1976), and § 17 of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77q(1976). Rule 10b-5 under the
Exchange Act is applicable to Ginnie Maes sold on a delayed-delivery basis. G.A. Thompson
v. Wendell J. Miller Mortgage Co., [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
95,668 (S.D.N.Y. JULY 22, 1976). The SEC has recently used its anti-fraud jurisdiction to
impose maintenance margin requirements on a dealer in Ginnie Maes in the settlement of
an administrative proceeding. In re Jon R. Brittenum Assoc., Exch. Act Release No. 17,894
(June 25, 1981).
Although one federal district court has found that a repurchase transaction in respect
of United States Treasury notes is not a purchase and sale of a security for purposes of §
10(b) of the Exchange Act, First Nat'l Bank v. Estate of Russell, Civ. No. H-77-1678 (S.D.
Tex. 1979), summary judgment found improper, 657 F.2d 668 (5th Cir. 1981) (genuine issue
as to characterization of transaction), relying on those cases distinguishing a commercial
loan transaction from investment transactions, see, e.g., McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497
F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 930 (1973), there is no doubt that Ginnie
Maes, like Treasury notes, fall within the definition of security in § 3(a)(10) of the Exchange
Act. Cf. Superintendent of Ins. v. Bankers Life & Casualty Co., 404 U.S. at 10 n.6 (Treasury
bonds are securities within meaning of § 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976)); In re SSIW
Corp., 7 Bankr. at 737 (Ginnie Maes are "securities" under Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978,
11 U.S.C. § 101(35) (Supp. IV 1980)). It seems unlikely that a party entering into sale and
repurchase transactions will be successful in contending that such transactions do not in
fact involve a "sale" as defined in § 3(a)(14) of the Exchange Act and thus avoid the anti-
fraud rules. In The Issuance of "Retail Repurchase Agreements" by Banks and Savings and
Loan Associations, Exch. Act Release No. 18,122 (Sept. 25, 1981), 17 C.F.R. § 231.6351
(1982), the SEC said that while traditional repurchase agreements (by contrast with retail
repurchase agreements) are not themselves separate securities, "the antifraud provisions of
such [federal securities] laws would apply to the offer, sale and purchase of U.S. government
securities occurring in connection with traditional repurchase agreements"; accord memo-
randum from Edward F. Greene, General Counsel of SEC, to John S.R. Shad, Chairman
(Sept. 3, 1982), furnished on September 7, 1982, by Mr. Shad to Benjamin S. Rosenthal,
Chairman of the House Commerce, Consumer and Monetary Affairs Subcommittee of the
Committee on Government Operations; cf. Rubin v. U.S., 449 U.S. 424 (1981) (pledge of
stock is "offer or sale" of security under § 17(a) of Securities Act); Herpich v. Wallace, 430
F.2d 792, 806-07 (5th Cir. 1970) (phrase "in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security" in § 10(b) and rule 10b-5 is to be construed broadly to effectuate congressional
purpose); Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v. Conaway, 515 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ala.
1981) (rule 10b-5 applies to commodity futures contract where underlying commodity is
security); Bache, Halsey, Stuart, Shields, Inc. v. University of Houston, 14 SEC. REG. & L.
REP. (BNA) 974 (Tex. Ct. App. 1982) (repurchase agreement encompasses both agreement
to sell and agreement to repurchase in future); State Nat'l Bank of Maryland, Exch. Act
Release No. 16,321 (Nov. 5, 1979). In SEC v. Miller, 495 F. Supp. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1980), the
court assumed application of § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976), to repurchase agreements;
see brief of Federal Reserve Bank of New York 6-7, In re Lombard-Wall, Inc., No. 82 B
11556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); see also SEC v. G. Weeks Sec. Inc., 483 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D.
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diction is potent. As an illustration, the SEC might take the posi-
tion that section 15(c)(1) of the Exchange Act, which authorizes
rules defining fraudulent action by broker-dealers, whether regis-
tered or not, is applicable to activities by non-registered dealers in
Ginnie Maes and thus deal with selling practices.
That Ginnie Maes themselves are exempt from the registration
requirement, however, does not necessarily mean that forward
commitments in Ginnie Maes are likewise exempt. This issue was
first addressed in Bache Halsey Stuart Inc. v. Affiliated Mortgage
Investment, Inc. 9 There the defendant sought to reject delivery of
Ginnie Maes pursuant to contracts for forward delivery on the the-
ory that such contracts are securities separate and distinct from
the underlying Ginnie Maes, hence subject to the registration re-
quirements of the Securities Act. The defendant argued that the
contracts are rights to purchase a security as that phrase is used in
the definition of the term "security" in section 2(1). The court held
that the forward contracts were not separate "securities" as de-
fined in the Securities Act 70 but rather contracts to sell securities
Tenn. 1980), rev'd on other grounds, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,683 (6th Cir.
May 19, 1982); Cosmopolitan Credit & Inv. Corp. v. Blyth EaStman Dillon & Co., 507 F.
Supp. 954 (S.D. Fla. 1981).
69. 445 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
70. Although the SEC declined an invitation by the court to submit a brief amicus
curiae on this issue, it argued in a memorandum of law submitted in SEC v. Winters Gov't
Sec. Corp., No. 6345-CIV-JLK (S.D. Fla. 1977), that delayed delivery transactions con-
ducted by Winters in Ginnie Maes "did not involve transactions for future delivery, but
rather concerned the purchase and sale of 'cash commodities for delayed delivery'." Memo-
randum at 31. The SEC said that
[Delayed-delivery] contracts are nothing more than legal instruments, privately nego-
tiated between the parties that presently fix the rights and obligations of the parties
concerning amount and interest rate, and provide payment for and delivery of the
securities at a specified date in the future. These ... contracts are not transferable,
nor are the contracts themselves traded as is the case with respect to GNMA futures
on the CBOT.
Although the GNMA securities subject to delayed-delivery contracts may be sold
before delivery date, it is not the delayed-delivery contract itself that is sold.
Memorandum at 33. While the SEC was contending that contracts were not futures con-
tracts for purposes of § 2(a)(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act, one may reasonably infer
from its argument that a delayed-delivery contract is not an instrument separate and apart
from the underlying Ginnie Mae and therefore not a separate security. The argument that
forward contracts in Ginnie Maes are not separate securities has an antecedent from the
inception of administration of the Securities Act. The Chief of the Securities Division of the
Federal Trade Commission (which administered the Securities Act prior to creation of the
SEC) ruled that contracts for the purchase or sale of securities on a "when, as and if issued"
basis were not securities:
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and that the sales were of exempted securities, therefore not sub-
ject to the registration requirements.
The Bache court also rejected the theory that forward contracts
might constitute investment contracts under section 2(1),1' citing
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. 71 In Howey, the Supreme Court defined an
investment contract as:
[A] contract, transaction or scheme whereby a person invests his money in a
common enterprise and is led to expect profits solely from the efforts of the
promoter or a third party, it being immaterial whether the shares in the
enterprise are evidenced by formal certificates or by nominal interests in
I am of the opinion that the form of contract submitted, or similar type of contract
calling merely for delayed delivery of securities, is not itself a 'security' within the
definition in Section 2(1) of the Securities Act but is rather a contract to buy or sell a
security on a contingency. It is true that under certain circumstances such a contract
could itself become a security and as such require registration apart from the security
to which it refers. But under such conditions the type of contract 'issued' by the
broker would have to possess those qualities common to a security, which do not
attach to the type of when issued contracts to which your refer. Thus, while transac-
tions covered by contracts of this character involve a 'sale' of the security to be is-
sued, the applicability of the Securities Act to the transactions would depend upon
the general applicability of the Act to the securities underlying the contracts and to
the transactions in these contracts.
Letter of Baldwin B. Bane, Chief of Securities Division of Federal Trade Commission, to
William A. Lockwood, general counsel of N.Y. Curb Exchange, SEc. REG. GUIDE (P-H) 1
1565.1 (June 8, 1934). Professor Loss points out that the SEC "has never adopted the view
.. . that the sale of the security on a when-issued basis involves the sale of an investment
contract distinct from the when-issued security." Loss, I SEcURITIEs REGULATION 496; see
also Loss and Vernon, When-Issued Securities Trading, 54 YALE L.J. 741, 767 (1945). It is
difficult to see how forward contracts in Ginnie Maes can be distinguished from such
delayed delivery contracts. In the case of a forward commitment for Ginnie Maes, the secur-
ities are not identified by issuer or pool number, but Ginnie Maes, because of their fungibil-
ity, are as specific as particular issues of other kinds of government securities.
Section 4(5) of the Securities Act provides an exemption from the registration require-
ments for non-assignable contracts to sell first mortgage notes and participation interests in
such notes where the securities are originated by certain banking institutions or a FHA -
approved mortgagee, so long as (i) the minimum aggregate sales price is at least $250,000;
(ii) the purchaser pays cash within 60 days of the time of the sale; and (iii) each purchaser is
buying for his own account. This section was developed by the SEC and the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation in order to clarify applicability of the securities laws to AM-
MINET, Inc. SECURITIES AND EXCI. COMM'N, ANNUAL REPORT o THE SEC FOR rrs FIscAL
YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1975, at 88. AMMINET was established under FHLMC sponsorship
to operate an automated trading information system in order to promote a more liquid sec-
ondary market for residential mortgages. Application of § 4(5) in a less public market may
be supererogatory.
71. See also G.A. Thompson & Co. v. Partridge, 636 F.2d 945, 962-63 (5th Cir. 1981)
(court declined to reach issue whether contract to sell Ginnie Mae was investment contract).
72. 328 U.S. 293 (1946).
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the physical assets employed in the enterprise. 3
Thus, there must be (i) an investment of money, (ii) in a common
enterprise, from which (iii) profits are derived, (iv) solely from the
efforts of individuals other than the investors.
Forward contracts have generally not involved an investment of
money; the purchase price has been payable only upon delivery of
the underlying Ginnie Mae against payment, although some deal-
ers are now requiring a forward purchaser of Ginnie Maes to put
up a "deposit" or "margin." Nonetheless, the promise to pay in the
future could fulfill the investment requirement of Howey.74 It is
more tenuous, however, to argue that a common enterprise exists.
The enterprise is particular to the investor, in which the value of
the investment is dependent upon events in the money market.
7 5
The risks and rewards of the investment are in no way shared.
Similarly, profits in these transactions are not derived from the
seller's efforts but from the fluctuations of the money market.
7'
In International Brotherhood of Teamsters v. Daniel, the Su-
preme Court further undermined arguments such as those made by
the plaintiff in Bache. According to the Court, the "investment"
element of an investment contract exists if (i) there is a volitional
act on the part of the asserted investor; (ii) specific consideration
passes from the asserted investor to the seller of the interest (spe-
cific consideration was defined as "tangible and definable consider-
ation"); (iii) the asserted investor receives "a separable financial
interest"; and (iv) the interest received possesses "the characteris-
tics of a security. 7 8 The requirement that a separable financial in-
terest be created, stressed by the Court's declaration that the fed-
eral securities laws "do not purport to set the substantive terms of
73. 328 U.S. at 298-99. See also SEC v. Koscott Interplanetary Inc., 497 F.2d 473 (5th
Cir. 1974).
74. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551, 560 n.12 (1979).
75. See LTV Fed. Credit Union v. UMIC Gov't Sec., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 819, 829-30
(N.D. Tex. 1981); cf. McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. 1338, 1341 (E.D. La.
1972).
76. Cf. Sinva, Inc. v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 253 F. Supp. 359,
366-67 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), where the court found that sugar futures contracts purchased by
the plaintiff did not constitute investment contracts. The court reasoned that instead of a
share in a common enterprise plaintiff acquired power to exercise dominion over specified
commodities. Further, the expected return as profit Was not contingent upon continuing
efforts of others. Accord, McCurnin v. Kohlmeyer & Co., 340 F. Supp. at 1341.
77. 439 U.S. 551 (1979).
78. Id. at 559-61.
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financial transactions, '79 would seem to exclude the typical Ginnie
Mae forward contract, whereby the investor simply agrees to the
terms of purchase or sale of the Ginnie Mae.80
The question has also been raised whether a stand-by arrange-
ment under which a person agrees to be willing to puchase Ginnie
Maes at a certain date and price in exchange for a commitment fee
might be a separate security under the federal securities laws and,
if so, whether it is an exempt security.81 The term security as de-
fined in both the Securities Act and the Exchange Act includes a
warrant or right to purchase a security but not the converse. Not-
withstanding this omission, the SEC has interpreted "equity secur-
ity" under the Exchange Act to include "any put . . . or privilege
of. . .selling such a security to another without being bound to do
so ' 82 in order to "clarify" the Federal Reserve's authority to regu-
late credit on such transactions.as Although this strains the SEC's
definitional power, courts have found put options to be securities
under this definition for purposes of rule 10b-5."
In LTV Federal Credit Union v. UMIC Government Securities,
Inc.,8 a federal district court refused to find a typical stand-by
commitment to be a security for purposes of either the registration
or the anti-fraud provisions of the securities laws.8 The court ex-
amined and rejected contentions that the stand-by commitment
79. Id. at 569.
80. See also United Hous. Found. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 851-52 (1975).
81. GNMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 54-56; but cf. Squibb Corp., no-action letter,
[1970-1971 Transfer Binder) FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 78,190 (June 23, 1971) (mandatory
agreement to purchase a security in the future is not required to be registered separately
under the Securities Act).
82. Rule 3a11-1, 17 C.F.R. § 240 (1982). Legislation proposed by the SEC and the
CFTC would amend the definition of security in the federal securities laws to include explic-
itly any option on a security. See SEC and CFTC Jurisdictional Agreement: Proposed Legis-
lation, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) V 83,096 (Feb. 2, 1982).
83. Notice of Proposed Amendment of Rule 3a11-1 under the Exchange Act, Exch.
Act Release No. 9929 (Jan. 29, 1973).
84. E.g., Vogel-Lorber v. Options on Shares, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) V 94,911 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 9, 1974). Cf. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,
421 U.S. 723, 751 (1975) (holders of puts and calls recognized as "purchasers" or "sellers" of
securities for purposes of rule 10b-5); § 9(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(b) (1976),
which provides that the SEC may regulate trading on national securities exchanges of puts,
calls, straddles and other options.
85. 523 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Tex. 1981).
86. The court acknowledged that § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b)
(1976), applied to the underlying Ginnie Mae, but found no evidence of a violation of that
statute. 523 F. Supp. at 835-37.
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was an "investment contract," an "evidence of indebtedness" and a
"warrant or a right to subscribe to or purchase" the underlying
Ginnie Mae, expressly following Bache. Even if the commitment
was a security, according to this court, it would not need to be
registered because Ginnie Maes are exempt securities.5 7
The SEC appears to have found the usual form of Ginnie Mae
stand-by to be a separate security, however, in at least one context.
In a statement of policy regarding implications for companies regu-
lated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 of reverse repur-
chase agreements, firm commitment agreements and stand-by
commitment agreements,8" the SEC characterized these agree-
ments as "securities trading practices" and said that they "may
involve the issuance by the investment company of a senior secur-
ity subject to the prohibitions and asset coverage requirements of
87. 523 F. Supp. at 833. Accord, Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d at 1155-59. A pecu-
liar variation of stand-by agreement called a "stand-by with pair-off" led a court to find a
separate security in SEC v. G. Weeks Sec., Inc., 483 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Tenn. 1980). The
arrangement involved an agreement between the defendant dealer and its customer simulta-
neously to buy and sell Ginnie Maes at a future date at specified prices, for which the cus-
tomer paid a commitment fee. The price to be paid by the dealer was set higher than that to
be paid by the customer. In addition, the dealer agreed to forego its right to purchase if the
market price of the Ginnie Maes was higher at the settlement date than the dealer's con-
tract price. Because of the simultaneous obligation to buy and sell, no actual exchange took
place. The arrangement offered to customers in Weeks is not typical of Ginnie Mae stand-
bys. The customer was simply investing the commitment fee with the dealer. The return,
measured by the spread between contract prices if the dealer's sell price was at or below
market at settlement date or, if market was higher, between market and the customer's
purchase price, was subject to the dealer's ability to reinvest successfully the commitment
fee. The court distinguished Bache on the basis that the transaction in that case did not
involve either a guaranteed return or any payment by the investor until the delivery date,
483 F. Supp. at 1244 n.6, and found that the arrangement was an "investment contract"
within the Howey test. The Weeks court also found the arrangement to be an evidence of
indebtedness:
Although a theoretical possibility of additional gain from market fluctuation existed,
the market presented no risk whatsoever to the customer. The only risk lay (and it
turned out to be a substantial one) in the potential inability of [the dealer] to per-
form under the agreement; that is, to satisfy its evidence of indebtedness. This in-
debtedness . .. could only be satisfied if [the dealer's] investment efforts were
successful.
483 F. Supp. at 1243. An SEC staff attorney was reported as saying that this way of business
"was unique to this firm." Anreder, Built on Stilts: Overspeculation, Thin Margins, Shake
the Market for Ginnie Maes, Barron's, Nov. 12, 1979, at 4, 37, col. 5; but see definition of
"yield maintenance contract," National Credit Union Admin. Interpretative Ruling No. 79-
4, 44 Fed. Reg. 51,195 (1980).
88. Securities Trading Practices of Registered Inv. Co., Inv. Co. Act Release No.
10,666 (Apr. 18, 1979).
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Section 18 of the Act."89 The SEC expressly disclaimed stating an
opinion whether these practices would constitute the issuance of
securities under the other securities laws, saying that its views
were:
[Biased not so much on the conclusion that reverse repurchase agreements
and firm commitment agreements, considered in isolation, are inherently se-
curities for all purposes, but more upon the proposition that trading prac-
tices involving the use by investment companies of such agreements for
speculative purposes or to accomplish leveraging fall Within the legislative
purposes of Section 18."
Notwithstanding the SEC's disclaimer, section 2(a)(36) of the
Investment Company Act, like its counterpart in the Securities
Act, defines the term "security" to mean any "evidence of indebt-
edness" as well as "any interest or instrument commonly known as
a 'security.' " 1 The SEC said that each of a stand-by commitment,
reverse repurchase agreement and forward commitment might in-
volve issuance of an evidence of indebtedness by an investment
company since it would have an obligation to pay in the future for
consideration presently received. Again we see the SEC straining
its jurisdiction to reach a practice it deems imprudent. While this
technique is a dubious administrative practice, the regulatory focus
on the particular considerations of this kind of financial intermedi-
ary is to be commended. An investment company serves very dif-
ferent functions from other intermediaries such as banks or thrift
institutions. Rather than attempt an overall scheme applicable to
89. Id. Cf. Diamant Inv. Co., no-action letter, [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 76,447 (avail. June 23, 1980).
90. Securities Trading Practices of Registered Inv. Co., Inv. Co. Act Release No.
10,666 (Apr. 18, 1979); cf. Westlake v. Abrams, [Current] COMM. Fur. L. RaP. (CCH)
21,199, at 24,948 (N.D. Ga. Nov. 26, 1980) (if federal securities laws did not apply to option
to buy commodities contract, victims of fraudulent commodity transactions would not have
remedies). Conversely, courts have been reluctant to find a security when an alternative
scheme of legislative protection was present. See Marine Bank v. Weaver, 102 S. Ct. 1220
(1982) (federal banking regulations); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S.
551, 569-70 (1969) (Employee Retirement Income Security Act); Board of Trade v. SEC, 677
F.2d 1137, 1159 (7th Cir. 1982) (Commodity Exchange Act); Berman v. Bache, Halsey, Stu-
art, Shields, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 311, 319 (S.D. Ohio 1979) (Commodity Exchange Act).
91. § 3(a)(10) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1976), does not specifically
include an "evidence of indebtedness" in its definition of security, but does include ."any
instrument commonly known as a 'security"' as well as other language that would compre-
hend most evidences of indebtedness. 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(12) (Supp. IV 1980). Indeed, the
Supreme Court has indicated the definitions are coterminous. Tcherepnin v. Knight, 389
U.S. 332, 335-36 (1967).
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all participants, as some have suggested,9e the regulator responsible
for a specific class of financial institution should respond to events
in the marketplace that affect the class based on the class' particu-
lar functions.
If registration under the Securities Act were necessary, how
would the requirement be applied? Because the underlying secur-
ity is obviously exempt, the contract would be the subject security
and the obligor on the contract would be the issuer. A registration
statement describing the contract and the financial status and bus-
iness of its obligor would not appear responsive to the problems
perceived in the trading markets that are discussed below. More-
over, because the securities might be resold prior to deliyery and
thus a new contract created, still another registration statement
might be required. To avoid these problems,93 market participants
would presumably seek exemption from registration under section
4(2) of the Securities Act, the private placement exemption. 94 Hav-
ing to qualify under this exemption with its burden of documenta-
tion and transfer restrictions would seriously inhibit the fluidity of
the Ginnie Mae markets. Moreover, banks would presumably have
a competitive advantage because of the exemption provided them
by section 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act,9 5 although the underwrit-
ing prohibitions of the Glass-Steagall Act" might come into play
as a result of the separate-securities concept. In addition, finding
that a forward or stand-by contract is a separate, non-exempt se-
curity would mean that the exemption from registration of section
92. See, e.g., TRi-AGENCY STUDY, supra note 13, at 219.
93. See Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Affiliated Mortgage Inv., Inc., 445 F. Supp. at 647.
94. But see Weyerhauser Mortgage Co., no-action letter, (avail. Nov. 12, 1973), in
which the SEC staff said it would not recommend action if Ginnie Maes, including those
issued by third parties, were sold publicly without compliance with the registration require-
ments of the Securities Act.
95. See IDS Mortgage Corp., no-action letter, [1971-1972 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc.
L. RE"'. (CCH) 78,505 (avail. Nov. 29, 1971) in which SEC staff took no-action position in
respect of registration of plan whereby investors would open an account at a savings bank,
the funds of which would be used to purchase Ginnie Maes, on the theory that both the
bank account and the securities were exempt under § 3(a)(2) of the Securities Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77c(a)(2) (1976), and the activity of the securities distributor and the ministerial acts of
the bank did not create a new security; cf. Salomon Bros., no-action letter, [1981-1982
Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 77,078 (avail. Nov. 20, 1981). But see Bank of
America Nat'l Trust & Say. Ass'n., no-action letter, (avail. May 19, 1977), in which the SEC
declined to issue an interpretation that the offering of conventional pass-throughs by that
bank would be exempt under § 3(a)(2), presumably on the theory that the pool is the issuer.
96. Banking Act of 1933, §§ 16 and 21; 12 U.S.C. §§ 24 and 378 (Supp. IV 1980).
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15(a) of the Exchange Act for dealers in exempt securities would
be lost and the rules relating to financial responsibility and protec-
tion of customers' funds and securities as well as various record-
keeping, disclosure and filing requirements would be applicable.
9 7
B. Commodity Exchange Act
The Commodity Exchange Act grants the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC) exclusive jurisdiction with respect to
"accounts, agreements. . . and transactions involving contracts of
sale of a commodity for future delivery, traded or executed on a
contract market . . . or any other board of trade, exchange, or
market . "..."98 In addition to specified agricultural products, the
term "commodity" includes "all services, rights, and interests in
which contracts for future delivery are presently or in the future
dealt in . . ... , Thus the definition includes rights and interests
that may be securities under the federal securities laws. The Act
does not apply, however, to "transactions in . . . government se-
curities, or mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments, unless
such transactions involve the sale thereof for future delivery con-
ducted on a board of trade."100 A board of trade includes any asso-
ciation of persons "who shall be engaged in the business of buying
or selling any commodity or receiving the same for sale on
97. The raison d'etre for the organizational form of many of these dealers would simi-
larly disappear: "Because of the effect of carrying U.S. government securities on the net
capital positions of a dealer, many brokerage firms have established unregistered affiliates to
conduct business in such securities." Financial Institutions Restructuring and Services Act
of 1981: Hearings on S. 1720 and S. 1721 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing
and Urban Affairs, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981)(testimony of John S.R. Shad, Chairman of
the SEC). Similar exemptions under state blue-sky laws would be lost, although bank deal-
ers would continue to be exempt under § 3(a)(4) and (5) of the Exchange Act. Cf. supra
note 32.
98. Section 2(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. IV 1980). The term "future delivery" does not
include the sale of a cash commodity for deferred shipment or delivery. Id. For an extensive
treatment of the distinction between the sale of cash commodities for deferred delivery and
the sale of commodities for future delivery, see the CFTC's opinion, In re Stovall, [1977-
1980 Transfer Binder] COMM. FuT. L. REP. (CCH) 1 20,941 (CFTC Doc. No. 75-7, Dec. 6,
1979).
99. Section 2(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. IV 1980). In adding this language to the defini-
tion of commodity, Congress was aware that the CFTC would have jurisdiction over futures
contracts based on government securities then being developed. S. REP. No. 1131, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 19, 23 reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5843, 5870.




In two early interpretative letters, the CFTC's Office of the Gen-
eral Counsel discussed the CFTC's jurisdiction over forward trans-
actions in Ginnie Maes.0 2 In the first, the CFTC was asked by a
dealer in government securities to define the "exclusive jurisdic-
tion" assigned the CFTC by the Commodity Exchange Act so as to
block an SEC investigation of the dealer's activities in government
securities. The dealer characterized the SEC investigation as an as-
sertion of jurisdiction over trading in GNMA "futures contracts"
in conflict with the CFTC's exclusive jurisdiction. The CFTC staff
responded that a group of persons, such as the Mortgage-Backed
Securities Dealers Association might be within the definition of a
board of trade as a result of its members' market activities, al-
though it did not have enough information to express an opinion
on that question. The letter stated that a person or organization
who has not submitted to the jurisdiction of the CFTC is not enti-
tled to the protection otherwise offered by the Commodity Ex-
change Act. Given the broad significance of the CFTC's exclusive
jurisdiction for these purposes, a person who has failed to submit
to such jurisdiction in violation of the Act should not, in the staff's
view, be permitted to raise the issue as a defense against alleged
violations of other statutes. 03
The second letter considered market activities of a broker in
Ginnie Maes through the Dealers Association. The broker executed
transactions with primary dealers in Ginnie Maes who were mem-
bers of the Dealers Association, charging a standard mark-up as its
commission. The broker did not disclose the identity of its princi-
pals in any transaction, effecting settlement through a bank. The
broker contended that its transactions in Ginnie Maes and pro-
posed transactions in Treasury obligations were not transactions
involving contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery
within the meaning of the Commodity Exchange Act. In it analy-
sis, the broker referred to distinguishing elements, including "the
privately-negotiated terms of the contracts, the lack of standard-
101. Id.
102. CFTC Interpretative Letters 77-11 and 77-12 [1977-1980 Transfer Binder] COMM.
FuTr. L. REP. (CCH) 20,466 and 20,467 (Aug. 17, 1977).
103. Although the stairs reluctance to assist this particular dealer is understandable,




ized contract terms, the lack of public outcry to establish price, the
fact that delivery is anticipated in connection with each purchase
and sale, the lack of a clearing house that becomes the buyer to
each seller and the seller to each buyer, and the fact that only
members of the trade participate in the transactions with no par-
ticipation by members of the public.""'' The staff responded that
it might be reasonable to conclude that the broker's transactions
do not involve contracts of sale of a commodity for future delivery
traded and executed on a board of trade, particularly given the
lack of public participation; in light of the "novel legal issues"
presented by the letter, however, the staff indicated reluctance to
express its opinion in this regard.
Construing the phrase "contract of sale of a commodity for fu-
ture delivery" appearing in section 2(a)(1), the CFTC staff noted
that, while not defined in the Commodity Exchange Act, this term
is broad enough to encompass any contract to market a commod-
ity, the terms of which are privately negotiated between buyer and
seller, with payment for and delivery of the commodity expected to
occur at some time in the future. In reviewing the legislative his-
tory, however, the staff concluded that the thrust of the provision
is toward the marketplace rather than the elements of deferred de-
livery. When "forward contracts" are traded by a group of persons
whose activities bring them within the definition of a board of
trade, the contracts may as a consequence lose their essentially pri-
vate nature and come within the category of contracts for future
delivery with whichtthe Commodity Exchange Act is concerned.
104. CFTC Interpretative Letter 77-12, [1977-1980 Transfer Binder) COMM. FuT. L.
REP. (CCH) 20,467 at 21,910. The Mortgage-Backed Securities Dealers Association has
asserted that delayed-delivery contracts serve different purposes than futures contracts:
Purchasers and sellers of futures contracts rarely take delivery of the commodity un-
derlying the contract dealt in; rather, they offset their obligations by a countervailing
purchase or sale on the exchange and pay or receive the difference in price between
the two off-setting transactions. Futures traders purchase GNMA futures contracts
primarily to hedge or speculate in interest rates. Delayed-delivery contracts, on the
other hand, are usually settled by delivery of GNMA securities.
Brief Amicus Curiae for the Mortgage-Backed Securities Dealers Association at 15-16,
Bache Halsey Stuart, Inc. v. Affiliated Mortgage Inv., Inc., 445 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
The latter assumption seems questionable at best. Many forward transactions in Ginnie
Maes are not settled by delivery, but instead are paired-off; that is, difference checks repre-
senting profits or losses are delivered in lieu of an exchange of securities for full payment.
The GNMA Report speculates that the number of transactions actually delivered may con-
stitute a small fraction of those transactions settled by pairing off. GNMA REPoir, supra
note 13, at 6-7.
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Nonetheless, the staff gave weight to remarks by the Senate Com-
mittee on Agriculture and Forestry that regulation by the CFTC is
unnecessary where there exists an informal market among institu-
tional participants in transactions for future delivery in specified
financial instruments so long as it is supervised by those agencies
having regulatory responsibility over those participants.0 5 Where
that market is not supervised and there is participation by mem-
bers of the general public, the staff believed that the Commodity
Exchange Act should be construed broadly to assure that the pub-
lic interest will be protected by the CFTC regulation of those
transactions.
Some of the elements cited by the broker and assumed by the
CFTC staff might be challenged. Contract terms have become
more homogeneous; the GNMA report questioned the extent to
which delivery is actually made in Ginnie Mae forward transac-
tions; 06 finally, a substantial number of forward transactions are
now being cleared through the MBS Clearing Corporation. Indeed,
in a 1979 letter to Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Chairman of
the Subcommittee on Housing and Urban Affairs, the CFTC noted
that:
[S]ince 1974 the so-called forward market in GNMA's has evolved and...
there have been efforts to establish a self-regulatory structure for this over-
the-counter market. Should this market become organized as a board of
trade or exchange for the public marketing of contracts for the future deliv-
ery of these instruments, the Commission would have exclusive jurisdiction
over its activities. Any such entity could, of course, seek designation under
the Commodity Exchange Act as a contract market.107
An alternative, exclusive theory of CFTC jurisdiction has re-
cently been put forth in a divided opinion by the Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit in Board of Trade v. SEC. 0 8 Holding that
Ginnie Mae options are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
CFTC,'0e the Seventh Circuit reasoned that the grant to the CFTC
under section 2(a)(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act of exclusive
105. S. REP. No. 1131, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & An.
NEWS at 5870.
'106. GNMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 6-7.
107. CFTC letter to Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr., Chairman of the Subcommittee
on Housing and Urban Affairs at 5 n.8 (Dec. 18, 1979).
108. 677 F.2d at 1145-53. For a critical analysis of this decision, see Pitt & Miles, SEC,
CFTC Jurisdictional Detente Undone by Court, Legal Times, Apr. 12, 1982, at 14.
109. Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d at 1146.
Vol. 21:39
Ginnie Maes
jursidiction with respect to agreements, including options, and
transactions that involve futures contracts included Ginnie Mae
options. 1 0 The court additionally found that the SEC had in the
first instance lacked jurisdiction under the Exchange Act to have
approved trading of such options on the CBOE,"' and thus had no
jurisdiction over Ginnie Mae options to be saved under the savings
clause of section 2(a)(1).1 2 A somewhat similar approach had been
suggested by CFTC v. American Board of Trade."' In this case a
federal district court interpreted restrictively exclusions from the
Commodity Exchange Act, finding that transactions in options to
purchase foreign currency were not transactions in foreign cur-
rency and hence not excluded from the Act. The Commodity Ex-
change Act excludes from its purview "transactions in foreign cur-
rency, security warrants, security rights, . . . government
securities, or mortgages and mortgage purchase commitments, un-
less such transactions involve the sale thereof for future delivery
conducted on a board of trade."1 The court in American Board of
Trade found that a transaction in options to purchase foreign cur-
rency was not a transaction in foreign currency, hence not ex-
cluded from CFTC jurisdiction. Applying the reasoning of these
two cases, a court might similarly hold stand-by or forward ar-
rangements not to be transactions in government securities."1
While the Act is not applicable to transactions in government se-
curities unless for future delivery on a board of trade, transactions
involving that commodity are subject to regulation under the
Act.116
110. The court stated: "Since GNMA's are not traditional stocks and GNMA options
have the character of a legitimate commodity derivative, we hold that the proposed GNMA
options 'involve' the pre-existing GNMA futures and therefore are within the exclusive
jurisidiction of the CFTC." Id. at 1152-53.
111. Id. at 1155-60. The court also found that options trading in Ginnie Maes was
foreclosed by the ban on commodity options trading adopted by the CFTC pursuant to §
4c(b) of the Commodity Exchange Act, 7 U.S.C. § 4c(b) (1976), and ratified by Congress by
the addition of § 4c(c) to the Act, 7 U.S.C. § 4c(c) (1976). 677 F.2d at 1143-44.
112. This clause, following the exclusive jurisdictional grant, provides that "except as
hereinabove provided, nothing contained in this section shall (i) supersede or limit the
[SEC's] jurisdiction .... " 7 U.S.C. § 2(i) (1976).
113. 473 F. Supp. 1177 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
114. Section 2(a)(1), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. IV 1980) (emphasis added).
115. See Note, The GNMA Securities Market: An Analysis of Proposals For a Regu-
latory Scheme, 9 FORDHAM URw. L.J. 457, 465-66 (1980).
116. This rationale of American Board of Trade is somewhat troubling, however, in
that the limiting clause of § 2(a)(1) of the Commodity Exchange Act, "unless such transac-
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C. Jurisdictional Overlap
During the deliberations over the 1974 amendments to the Com-
modity Exchange Act, the House Committee on Agriculture sug-
gested the following delineation between the respective jurisdic-
tions of the SEC and the CFTC:
Futures trading regulation is essentially a regulation of a marketing device,
that is, a contract right which is terminable at a time certain, for agricul-
tural commodities while the SEC regulates the handling of certificates of
tangible ownership which are permanent in nature.
...Additionally, the concept of margin-which is a guarantee of per-
formance in the futures market as contrasted with an extension of credit by
the broker in the securities industry . . . and the handling of devices such
as options are, and should remain, entirely different within the respective
spheres of regulation.
The existence of another, more volatile regulatory function with the
tions involve the sale thereof for future delivery on a board of trade," appears more sweep-
ing than the overall exclusion as read by the court. Put differently, a transaction involving
sale of foreign currency of government securities for future delivery is no more a transaction
in those instruments than is an option. This dilemma might be avoided on the theory that
stand-by and forward arrangements are security rights, as that term is used in the introduc-
tory clause of the exclusion. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 81-84 and 88-90 (stand-by
as separate security). On the other hand, that theory seems inconsistent with the notion
that forward contracts in Ginnie Maes are not separate securities. See discussion supra note
70; supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
In Board of Trade v. SEC, 677 F.2d 1137 (7th Cir. 1982), the court rejected defendants'
contention that options on Ginnie Maes come within the definition of security rights under
1 2(a)(1), stating that it would have been illogical to have excluded calls but not puts and
referring to Congress having specifically discarded language proposed for the exclusion that
had included puts and calls for securities. Id. at 1154. The court reconciled the above di-
lemma as follows:
[T]he 'unless' clause is needed (and was enacted) to except the transactions in secur-
ity rights, etc. that occur when a futures contract is actually performed or an option is
exercised. The futures or options contract is not a transaction in a commodity but
insofar as it may presage some future transfer of the commodity, the latter is ex-
cepted from the [exclusion] by the 'unless' clause.
Id. at n.3.
In SEC v. G. Weeks Sec., Inc., 483 F. Supp. 1239 (W.D. Tenn. 1980), however, defen-
dants argued that they were dealers in futures contracts under the regulatory jurisdiction of
the CFTC. The court said that the futures characteristics of the arrangement were "mere
facade," thus an "economic realism" approach required the finding of a security. The risk of
the customer, based on the dealer's success or failure in investing his funds, was identical to
that associated with traditional securities. Id. at 1244. The court also rejected any character-
ization of the Dealers Association as a "board of trade" under the Commodity Exchange
Act. Id. at 1245.
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SEC could create difficulties that could probably never be overcome. 7
Nonetheless, the jurisdictional overlap of the federal securities
and commodities laws has been the subject of extended dialogue
between the SEC and the CFTC."' The Chairman of the SEC re-
quested in 1975 that the CFTC postpone further designations of
contract markets for the trading of futures on securities because of
problems arising from coexisting jurisdiction.'19 Describing "a situ-
ation where two distinct statutory and regulatory schemes appear.
applicable, in a manner not yet precisely determined, to a variety
of transactions and relationships involving securities,' ' 20 the chair-
man suggested that a series of policy questions be considered by
both the agencies. In reply, a memorandum of the CFTC's general
counsel reaffirmed its claim of exclusive jurisdiction over futures
contracts on Ginnie Maes and other financial instruments.1
2
1
Thereafter, in connection with the reauthorization of the CFTC in
1978, the SEC asked for curtailment of the commodity agency's
jurisdiction and that the SEC be granted full authority over fu-
tures contracts written on financial instruments and other securi-
ties. 1 22 Notwithstanding the SEC's pleas, Congress did not alter
the CFTC's jurisdictional franchise, although it did direct the
117. 119 CONG. REc. 41,135 (1973) (remarks of Rep. Poage, Chairman, House Commit-
tee on Agriculture, in introducing H.R. 13113). See also H.R. REP. No. 975, 93rd Cong., 2d
Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1589; Greenstone, The CFTC and
Government Reorganization; Preserving Regulatory Independence, 33 Bus. LAw. 163, 201-
05 (1977). Concerning exclusive jurisdiction over futures transactions on a contract market,
see id. at 205-12; Johnson, The Commodity Futures Trading Commission Act; Pre-emption
as Public Policy, 29 VAND. L. Rav. 1, 16 (1976).
118. SEC-Commodity Futures Trading Commission Jurisdictional Correspondence,
[1975-1976 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1 80,336 at 85,861 (Nov. 13, 1975).
119. Id. at 85,863.
120. Id. at 85,861. While Chairman Hills took the position that contracts for future
delivery of Ginnie Maes were securities, he was addressing whether the SEC or CFTC had
jurisdiction to regulate such futures contracts. Whether the futures contracts were securities
under the Securities Act might logically follow but was beyond the scope of his letter.
121. Id. at 85,863-64; ef. P & C Inv. Club v. Becker, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 98,326 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 10, 1981) (interest-rate futures contract not an
investment contract under Exchange Act); but cf. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v.
Conaway, 515 F. Supp. 819 (N.D. Ala. 1981) (treasury bill futures contract covered by rule
10b-5 under Exchange Act); Fisher v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 98,397 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 18, 1981) (interest-rate futures
contract is a "security" within meaning of § 3(a)(10) of Exchange Act).
122. Extend Commodity Exchange Act: Hearings on H.R. 10285 Before the Subcomm.
on Conservation and Credit of the House Comm. on Agriculture, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
(1978) (statement of Harold M. Williams, Chairman of the SEC).
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CFTC to consult with the SEC respecting activities that relate to
its responsibilities. 12 3 Thus, recent legislative history supports the
CFTC's claim of primacy in the penumbra of its jurisdiction. Nev-
ertheless, the debate was reopened after the SEC approved Ginnie
Mae option trading on the CBOE. 124 The chairmen of the SEC and
CFTC appointed by President Reagan reached an agreement that
the SEC would have sole jurisdiction of the markets for options on
securities, including United States government and other exempt
securities, and that the CFTC would retain exclusive jurisdiction
over trading on boards of trades of futures contracts and options
on futures contracts in respect of exempt securities (other than
municipal securities). 25 While both chairmen claimed existing in-
terpretative authority to implement the agreement, the majority in
Board of Trade v. SEC found a "clear, contrary statutory man-
date. ' 1 2e In any event, the agencies have proposed amendments to
the statutes administered by them that embody the agreement.
127
These are presently being considered by Congress.1
28
V. AREAS OF CONCERN
As stated in the GNMA Report, "the vast majority of trading
takes place without significant problems."' 2  Nevertheless, as the
volume of trading in these securities developed and attracted in-
creasing numbers of participants, abuses occurred. These abuses
may be generally described as involving speculation inappropriate
for financial institutions. A move in interest rates after the
purchase or sale of Ginnie Maes for forward delivery or entering
into a stand-by commitment can result in significant losses and
gains for the contracting parties. An absence of margin and mark-
to-market requirements creates the potential for profit or loss
without any investment. This in turn means greater financial expo-
123. Commodity Exchange Act, § 2(a)(8)(B), 7 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. IV 1980).
124. See supra note 26.
125. Press Release on SEC-CFTC Agreement to Resolve Jurisdictional Issues, [1981-
1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) T 83,062 (Dec. 7, 1981).
126. 677 F.2d at 1142 n.8.
127. SEC-CFTC Jurisdictional Agreement: Proposed Legislation, [1981-1982 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,096 (Feb. 2, 1982).
128. See S. REP. No. 390, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982); H.R. REP. No. 626, pt. 2, 97th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
129. GNMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 73; accord TRi-AGENCY STUDY, supra note 13,
at 106-07.
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sure for participants than in markets that require a stake. More-
over, accounting practices that do not reflect currently the value of
future commitments obscure or delay recognition of the impact of
market fluctuations, thus encouraging as well as deflecting a disci-
plining focus on speculative activities. Finally, Ginnie Maes, like
other securities, are sometimes the subject of improper selling
practices.
In response to these abuses, regulators have applied existing le-
gal remedies with what appears to be reasonable success. More-
over, as we shall see below, sophisticated regulators have tailored
regulation to the particular circumstances of their regulated enti-
ties and have required accounting practices that serve to identify
portfolio problems before they attain catastrophic proportions. At
the same time, scandals in the Ginnie Mae markets"' have agi-
tated some in government to put forth indiscriminate panaceas
that would, in the writer's view, involve costly regulatory overkill.
A. Marketing Abuses
Beginning in 1975 the SEC has brought a series of cases dealing
with marketing abuses by dealers in Ginnie Maes. The first in-
volved suitability of forward transactions for a non-profit institu-
tion.13 1 The SEC found the forward purchases were unsuitable be-
cause the customer did not have the financial capacity to
consummate the purchases, and therefore would have to sell the
commitments prior to or at settlement date. This meant that the
customer was "speculating contrary to its investment objectives
that there would be a drop in interest rates before the settlement
date . . . ." Furthermore, the firm failed to supervise adequately
the activities of its representative with a view to preventing unsuit-
able sales. In the order of settlement, the securities firm agreed to
revise its procedures relating to the sale of government securities,
including a requirement that the firm's branch office managers give
advance approval in writing of forward contracts in excess of a
nominal limit and that trading activity be monitored to detect
promptly excessive trading by the firm's account executives. The
130. See, e.g., Anreder, Built on Stilts: Overspeculation, Thin Margins, Shake the
Market for Ginnie Maes, Barron's, Nov. 12, 1979, at 4; Rustin, Securities Firm's Flop
Reveals Big Risk Run by Some Small Banks, Wall St. J., Oct. 28, 1977, at 1, col. 6.
131. In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Exch. Act Release No. 11,515
(July 2, 1975).
Duquesne Law Review
order reflected that the securities firm had reached settlement with
the institutional customer, who had incurred a substantial loss.
Marketing of Ginnie Maes became a major regulatory concern in
1977 following disclosures of problems with the Winters Govern-
ment Securities Corporation."s2 After a general increase in interest
rates and concomitant fall in the market price of Ginnie Maes,
Winters' customers sustained enormous paper losses. Some dis-
avowed trades and refused delivery. Winters was forced to close its
doors, claiming that investors failed to make good on commitments
for $2 million in securities. The SEC then filed a civil complaint
alleging that Winters, its principal stockholders, officers and direc-
tors, as well as several salespersons, violated the anti-fraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws in connection with the offering
and sale of Ginnie Maes and other securities, primarily to banks,
savings and loan associations and credit unions.3 3 More specifi-
cally, the Winters complaint alleged that the defendants engaged
in (i) high-pressure sales techniques through untrained and un-
supervised salespersons, who recommended Ginnie Maes and other
securities without regard for the customers' financial conditions
and without adequately disclosing the risks of trading for delayed
delivery; (ii) churning (engaging in transactions for the purpose of
generating commissions or mark-ups); (iii) unauthorized transac-
tions (called "stuffed pigs"); (iv) utilizing sham accounts; (v)
charging unfair prices for securities;* and (vi) enticing customers
into reverse repurchase agreements that resulted in their purchase
of excessive numbers of securities. Moreover, Winters was charged
with making misrepresentations about Ginnie Maes and failing to
disclose material facts concerning its financial condition and that
of certain customers when purchasing securities on their behalf
from other dealers, as those customers were financially incapable
of taking delivery of the securities and Winters did not have suffi-
cient capital to pay for securities it had purchased from other deal-
ers. The defendants consented to entry of an injunction without
admitting or denying the allegations of the complaint.
Soon thereafter, another scandal broke: in SEC v. Harwell,134 de-
132. These problems ore described generaly at GNMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 73-
75; Tm-AGENCY STUDY, supra note 13, at 143-45, case #4.
133. SEC v. Winters Gov't Sec. Corp., No. 6345-CIV-JLK (S.D. Fla. 1977).




fendants were accused of interpositioning affiliated brokers in
transactions for the University of Houston, charging it excessive
fees and executing its transactions away from the market. Accord-
ing to the GNMA Report, these problems were caused by "the
grandiose schemes of a relatively low level investment officer of the
University who did not fully understand the ramifications of hedg-
ing and spreading in the forward and futures markets. 185 The in-
vestment officer financed many transactions by means of
"pyramiding," a device by which securities purchased are used as
collateral for financing still further purchases.13 6 Reportedly the
University had commitments exceeding $450 million8 7 and sus-
tained losses of $17 million.138
A recent case of alleged abuses in the Ginnie Mae markets is
SEC v. Cantor Fitzgerald Agency Corp." 9 in which the SEC
charged a dealer and certain officers and directors with violations
of anti-fraud provisions of the securities acts in connection with
transactions in Ginnie Maes and other government guaranteed se-
curities. According to the SEC's complaint, the dealer entered into
numerous adjusted trades with thrift institutions and falsely con-
firmed purchases at above-market prices without disclosure that
these purchases were conditioned upon contemporaneous sales to
the same customers of similar securities, also at above-market
prices. The thrift institutions were thus able to defer recognition of
losses that occurred when the market prices of their securities de-
clined. The SEC also alleged that in some instances the dealer paid
the customer a fee in the amount of one percent of the principal
amount of the transaction, which was typically recognized by the
customer as current income. However, those transactions were con-
firmed at prices one point above the market; thus the customer
recorded the purchase at a price inflated by the one-point fee. It
was further alleged that the dealer engaged in adjusted trades in
stand-by transactions. In these transactions, existing stand-by
commitments were purchased and new stand-by commitments
135. GNMA REP oRT, supra note 13, at 75.
136. Id. at 76.
137. Lawsuits Involving University of Houston Indicate Sizeable Broker Losses in
Scandal, Wall St. J., Apr. 10, 1978, at 16, col. 3.
138. Til-AGENCY STuDY, supra note 13, at 151-52, case #9.




were sold contemporaneously, in each case at prices above the cur-
rent market. In connection with the sale by the dealer of the new
stand-by commitments, the dealer purchased a matching stand-by
from a third party from whom it received a fee much larger than
that which it paid to the thrift institution. Again, the complaint
alleged that the confirmation failed to disclose material elements
of these transactions. With the exception of one individual defen-
dant, the defendants consented, without admitting or denying the
allegations, to the entry of a final judgment of permanent injunc-
tion. The dealer also agreed to pay certain amounts to customers
involved in the described transactions.
There have been many reports of thrift institutions speculating
in forward commitments in Ginnie Maes. According to a bulletin of
the Office of Supervisory Agent in Little Rock, "files of the Federal
Home Loan Bank Board contain numerous examples of associa-
tions overcommitting for future delivery and booking substantial
losses on commitments."14 Some savings and loan associations
have attempted to offset losses realized from speculation in securi-
ties by issuing forward commitments to purchase securities at
prices above the market and recording as current income the fees
received for issuing these commitments. " '
The cases cited above are illustrative of the abuses that have
taken place in the Ginnie Mae markets. Other publicized trading
abuses with Ginnie Maes have involved mortgage bankers, com-
mercial banks and credit unions. These are set forth in detail in
the 1980 report of the study of the government-related securities
markets conducted jointly by the Treasury, the SEC, and the Fed-
eral Reserve Board (Tri-Agency Study).' 2 Rather than relate more
cases here, let us turn to the specific practices that created the
problems.
140. Bulletin No. 77-10 (July 22, 1977); see also Office of Supervisory Agent (Little
Rock), Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Bulletin No. 78-14 (May 15, 1978) (available
through the Office of Supervisory Agent, Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Little Rock,
Ark.).
141. Office of Supervisory Agent (Little Rock), Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Bul-
letin No. 78-20; see also SEC v. Cantor Fitzgerald Agency Corp. [1980 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,671 at 98,553 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1980).
142. Tm-AGENCY STUDY, supra note 13, at 140-75; see also Anreder, supra note 2; Bar-





Specific practices identified as improper or undesirable in the
Ginnie Mae markets have included excess speculation, overtrading,
pyramiding, free-riding, discount overpricing, excessive mark-ups,
and unsuitable transactions. These practices have been exacer-
bated in some cases by misrepresentations and high-pressure sales
techniques applied by untrained and unsupervised sales personnel
and have sometimes involved undercapitalized dealers.
Speculation in Ginnie Maes contributes to the depth and liquid-
ity of the forward market and is perfectly appropriate for those
market participants who are knowledgeable as to the risks involved
and can afford to lose. Speculation in the movement of interest
rates through Ginnie Mae forwards without anticipating delivery
of the underlying securities is not appropriate, however, for
financial intermediaries and charitable institutions. Nonetheless,
some of these institutions - like the University of Houston in the
Harwell proceeding described above - motivated by overzealous-
ness on the part of naive investment officers and sometimes lured
on by aggressive and unprincipled salesmen, have engaged in such
speculation, frequently with a bad ending.
The practice by which customers are permitted to avoid realizing
a loss on a prior trade by swapping securities at prices away from
the current quoted market is called adjusted trading143 or some-
times overtrading. As described in the SEC's complaint in Cantor
Fitzgerald, the customer may thus conceal losses previously in-
curred.14 4 In a variation of adjusted trading called "fee trading,"
the dealer purchases the customer's security at a price above the
market, but the customer pays the dealer a fee representing the
difference between the contract price and the market price. When
the customer purchases a new security from the dealer, also above
market price, the fee is returned. The fee may be treated by the
customer as a receivable, deferred expense or other asset. 45
By entering into repurchase agreements with securities pur-
chased with proceeds of other such agreements, leverage (which is
143. See 12 C.F.R. § 703.3(a)(10) (1982) for the National Credit Union Administrator's
definition of adjusted trading; see also National Credit Union Admin. Interpretative Ruling
No. 79-4, 44 Fed. Reg. 55,195 (1980).
144. See supra text accompanying note 139.




return on capital in excess of that contributed by the investor) can
be magnified. This technique' called pyramiding, requires the in-
vestor to seek investments producing income sufficient to carry the
repurchase agreements. Thus the temptation increases to ignore
quality or suitability. As the pyramid rises, so does the risk to the
enlarged asset base.14 Excess speculation has been made easier by
the absence of margin requirements, although there seems to be a
trend toward individual dealers requiring margin. If the purchaser
of Ginnie Maes for forward delivery does not have to put up any
margin or deposit, the loss exposure is infinite. Most leveraging
techniques require some cash investment, thus placing an outer
limit on leverage possibilities.
1 47
Free-riding is entering into a contract of purchase without any
thought of settling the transaction. Third-party deliveries, which
are deliveries to a party other than the original contracting party,
are particularly conducive to speculative activities such as free-rid-
ing. Third-party deliveries are typically made at transaction prices
different from the original contract price.
Discount overpricing involves representing to the customer that
the pool will pay down faster than normal, thus overstating the
likely yield. A mark-up not reasonably related to the current mar-
ket price of a security is an excessive mark-up.148 Excessive mark-
ups are frequently accompanied by high pressure sales techniques,
which are, of course, not novel to Ginnie Maes.149
A transaction in Ginnie Maes should be suitable to a customer's
investment objectives and financial situation. Risks associated with
interest-rate fluctuations are greater with forward contracts,1 50 be-
cause these transactions remain open for long periods of time. Fur-
146. See, e.g., TI-AGENCY STUDY, supra note 13, at 143-45, case #4; cf. Investment
Trusts and Investment Companies: Hearings on S. 3580 before a Subcomm. of the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, 76th Congress, 3d Sess. 1025 (1940)(discussion of the
perils of leverage to investment companies).
147. Securities Trading Practices of Registered Inv. Co., Inv. Co. Act Release No.
10,666 at n.13 (Apr. 18, 1979).
148. NASD MANUAL (CCH) 2154 (Nov. 1981); see also Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC,
139 F.2d 434 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786, holding that where the market price
is not disclosed to a customer, a dealer represents impliedly that his retail price is related
reasonably to the market price.
149. See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURI-
TIES MARKETS, H. Doc. No., 95 pt.1, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 245-330 (1964).








The events described above caused intense regulatory scrutiny of
the trading in Ginnie Maes. Responding to scandals in the market-
place, GNMA has addressed imprudent practices on the part of
issuers of Ginnie Maes. The SEC has deployed its anti-fraud arse-
nal against overreaching by dealers, and the New York Stock Ex-
change has established margin requirements applicable to transac-
tions in Ginnie Maes. (As we shall see in a later section, dealers in
government-guaranteed securities have established a discrete sys-
tem of self-regulation, which includes fair practice rules - suita-
bility, disclosure, etc.; qualification requirements; financial respon-
sibility and record-keeping provisions; and arbitration and
enforcement procedures.) Probably the most efficacious responses
are those of regulators of investor participants who have taken
steps directed toward the avoidance of speculation in Ginnie Maes,
including accounting procedures that currently reflect the financial
impact of forward transactions and direct investment restrictions.
Finally, legislation that would implement a comprehensive, and I
believe redundant and costly, regulatory scheme of the Ginnie Mae
markets has been introduced in Congress.
A. Regulation of Issuers
In 1977 GNMA promulgated rules concerning prudent business
practices of issuers.15 2 These rules require issuers to adopt proce-
dures designed to ascertain the financial capacity and business rep-
utation of dealers and investors with whom the issuers do business
as well as internal management controls over activities in forward
contracts. 153 Afterward, the director of the SEC's enforcement divi-
sion suggested to GNMA that it go farther and condition its guar-
antee on representations by issuers of forward contracts that they
would (i) deposit 10% of the purchase price into an escrow account
as margin and maintain that margin at 10% of the market value of
151. See discussion of suitability rules, infra pt. VI, under B. Regulation of Dealers.
152. Memorandum from John H. Dalton, President of GNMA to Issuers of GNMA
Mortgage-Backed Securities (Aug. 8, 1977).
153. GNMA GUIDE, supra note 2, at para. 2-5.d.
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the contract, i.e., mark-to-market; (ii) provide a maximum delivery
period of ninety days; and (iii) use an offering circular that would
describe the forward contract and the issuer as well as set forth the
potential risks. 15 4 The SEC division director described these mea-
sures as stop-gaps, stating that ultimately there would have to be
direct regulation over forward contracts and dealers in the con-
tracts.'55 Several years later, GNMA adopted rules partly respon-
sive to this suggestion.'" These rules, required issuers to incorpo-
rate certain terms and conditions in their forward contracts,
including a provision requiring both parties to the contract to
mark to market and provide margin based on any deficit. Also, is-
suers must engage only in transactions suitable to their financial
circumstances, taking into account financial capability and con-
tractual obligations, and must abide by the prudent business prac-
tices previously published by GNMA.
B. Regulation of Dealers
As noted earlier, the SEC has broad anti-fraud jurisdiction over
dealers in Ginnie Maes. Pursuant to this jurisdiction, it has insti-
tuted numerous enforcement proceedings relating to transactions
in Ginnie Maes.157 In addition, it has asserted at various times the
154. Letter from Stanley Sporkin, Director of Enforcement Division, SEC, to John H.
Dalton, President, GNMA (Oct. 18, 1977).
155. Id.
156. 45 Fed. Reg. 40,556 (1980) (amending 24 C.F.R. 390.50-.54, 390.60-.61); GNMA
GUIDE, supra note 2, at para. 2-5.
157. See, e.g., Cantor Fitzgerald Agency Corp. [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 1 97,671 at 98,553 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 29, 1980) (adjusted trading); SEC v. Harwell,
No. 78-1916 (S.D. Tex. Dec. 5, 1979) (interpositioning, pyramiding and excessive prices, fail-
ure to reasonably supervise, and bookkeeping violations); SEC v. American Bankshares
Corp., No. 77-750 (E.D. Wis. July 2, 1979); SEC v. Trans-American Gov't Sec., Inc., No. 79-
2163 (W.D. Tenn. Mar. 9, 1979) (adjusted trading); SEC v. Fidelity Sec., Inc., No. 78-2410
(W.D. Tenn. Aug. 15, 1978) (adjusted trading and excessive fees); SEC v. Russell, Kennedy
and Hodgden, Inc., No. 77-1080 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 10, 1978) (pyramiding of repurchase agree-
ments); SEC v. Financial Corp., No. 75-3391 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 1976) (inability to meet re-
purchase-agreement obligations); In re Bevill, Bresler & Schulman, Inc., SEC File No. 3-
5934 (1980) (misleading statements concerning risks of forwards and stand-bys, adjusting
trading, unauthorized trading, unsuitable transactions, excessive prices, failure to reasonably
supervise and bookkeeping violations); In re First Nat'l Bank of Chicago Bond Dep't, SEC
File No. 3-5326 (1977); In re Kratze, SEC File No. 3-5231 (1977) (interpositioning), In re
Jon R. Brittenum & Assoc., Exch. Act Release No. 17,894 (June 25, 1981) (unauthorized
trading in customer accounts); In re Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., Exch. Act
Release No. 11,515 (July 2, 1975) (unsuitable transactions).
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need for direct regulation of the market.' This regulation, in the
view of former SEC Chairman Williams, should be modeled on the
self-regulatory system created by statute for the municipal securi-
ties market under the Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board. 169
The SEC has also reacted to its perception of abuses in sales prac-
tices by examining whether a contract for delayed delivery of Gin-
nie Maes may be a separate security (either by itself or when com-
bined with the Ginnie Mae security) under the Securities Act, but
it avoided taking a position on this issue when it declined an invi-
tation to submit an amicus curiae brief in Bache.160 Notwithstand-
ing this reluctance to take a formal position, and contrary deci-
sions in Bache and LTV Federal Credit Union, the SEC might
still argue that stand-by arrangements and forward contracts are
separate securities.' These arguments do not appear to be pre-
cluded by the jurisdictional accord with the CFTC described
above."6 2
The SEC has considered more direct regulation in proposed
amendments to the financial responsibility rules under the Ex-
change Act. Soliciting comments on a range of issues regarding the
rules, the SEC pointed to increased involvement in recent years by
brokers and dealers in Ginnie Maes:
Not only do [broker-dealers] act as intermediaries between the GNMA issu-
ers, performing broker or dealer functions, but they also have used such
instruments as a means to speculate on interest rates or hedge other posi-
tions or, in the case of repurchase agreements, to borrow cash for short peri-
ods of time .... It may be necessary ... to examine brokers' and dealers'
158. See, e.g., letter from SEC Chairman Williams to Senator Harrison Williams (July
9, 1979).
159. Id. Prior to the 1975 amendments to the Exchange Act, the regulatory environ-
ment for dealers in municipal securities was comparable to that which presently exists for
Ginnie Mae dealers, with dealers subject to different schemes of regulation depending
whether other activities required registration under the Exchange Act or membership in a
self-regulatory organization. The 1975 amendments eliminated the exemption for muncipal
securities dealers, gave the SEC added rule-making authority over these dealers and pro-
vided a new self-regulatory structure.
160. 445 F. Supp. 644 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
161. When Ginnie Mae futures contracts began trading on the Board of Trade of the
City of Chicago, the SEC asserted these contracts were securities in the context of a juris-
dictional dispute with the CFTC. Letter from SEC Chairman Hills, [1975-1976 transfer
Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 80,336 (Nov. 13, 1975). Since that time, this market has
operated under the exclusive jurisdiction of the CFTC. See supra text accompanying note
125.
162. See supra text accompanying notes 125-28.
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involvement in this entire area to determine if there is need for more spe-
cific requirements than those now in effect. 63
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) has also considered the
capital treatment and margin requirements of members engaged in
trading Ginnie Maes."'" Reciting concerns over substantial losses
by NYSE members, the NYSE submitted tentative rule proposals
for comments to those members who had reported that they were
engaged in the Ginnie Mae markets. The submission stated that
"due to the unusual length of time transactions in new GNMA of-
ferings are outstanding and the general inability to immediately
identify and guarantee delivery of a specific new issue, an abnor-
mal amount of risk and exposure does exist."'" Accordingly, the
NYSE concluded that net capital and margin requirements in re-
spect of Ginnie Maes should be strengthened. A subsequent publi-
cation reflected the dilemma in striking a proper balance between
"protecting member firm customers by properly comprehending
GNMA associated risks in the fabric of financial responsibility
rules," and "sufficiently realistic standards to permit member orga-
nizations to compete with non-regulated or differently regulated
participants in the GNMA markets.""' The memorandum stated
that the "strikingly different nature of the GNMA security and
participants in that market, and the national interest relationship
of GNMAs to the housing construction cycle, combine to merit
substantially different capital and margin treatment than is other-
wise the case, provided that a sophisticated risk evaluation system
is in place." The memorandum transmitted revised proposals for
margin and capital standards relating to Ginnie Maes that broad-
ened the classification for mortgage bankers exempt from the mar-
gin requirement and liberalized mark-to-the-market deductions
from capital. Afterward, the NYSE issued Interpretation Memo
78-5, which narrows the definition of accounts previously exempt
from margin requirements, requires member firms to establish risk
163. Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, Exch. Act Release No. 17,208
(Oct. 9, 1980); see also Net Capital Requirements for Brokers and Dealers, Exch. Act Re-
lease No. 18,418, sec. VI (Jan. 13, 1982); cf. Exchange Proposals to Trade Options on U.S.
Treasury Securities, Exch. Act Release No. 17,795, sec. III (May 11, 1981).
164. See NYSE Information Memorandum 43 (1977).
165. Letter from Robert M. Bishop, Senior Vice President of NYSE, to chief execu-
tives of member organizations (Dec. 15, 1977).
166. Memorandum from Robert M. Bishop, Senior Vice President of NYSE, to chief
executives of member organizations (May 15, 1978).
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limits for exempt accounts as well as mortgage bankers' accounts
that are non-exempt, and sets forth capital charges based on a per-
centage of mark-to-market deficits and the period between trade
date and delivery date. Most recently, the NYSE has proposed to
establish margin requirements on proposed new option contracts
on Ginnie Maes and Treasury issues.""7
Members of the New York Stock Exchange are required under
its rule 405 (the "know-your-customer" rule) to "use diligence to
learn the essential facts relative to every customer, every order,
every cash or margin account accepted or carried . . . ." NYSE
members bear a burden under rule 405 as well as rule 342 (dealing
with supervision) for sophisticated evaluation of credit risks in
GNMA trading. 68 Members of the National Association of Securi-
ties Dealers (NASD) are held to a similar standard.'6 9 Both these
standards have been applied in the context of Ginnie Mae trad-
ing.17 0 Pursuant to the Exchange Act, the SEC has also promul-
gated suitability requirements for brokers and dealers not mem-
bers of registered exchanges or associations. Rule 15b-10(3)
provides that in making a recommendation for a purchase or sale,
a broker or dealer must have reasonable grounds to believe the rec-
ommendation is not unsuitable in light of information furnished by
the customer after reasonable inquiry of the customer as to its in-
vestment objectives, financial situation and needs as well as any
other information known to the broker or dealer. Thus, all regis-
tered dealers are subject to formal suitability rules. Those not reg-
istered are likely to be held to a comparable standard under the
167. Notice of Filing of Proposed Rule Change by the N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., Exch.
Act Release No. 18,153 (Oct. 6, 1981).
168. Memorandum from Robert M. Bishop, Senior Vice President of NYSE (May 15,
1978).
169. Article III, sec. 2 of the NASD's Rules of Fair Practice provides: "In recom-
mending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of any security a member shall have
reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for such customer as
to his other security holdings and as to his financial situation and needs." NASD MANUAL
(CCH) 1 2152 (June 1976). For a general discussion of the suitability doctrine, see N. WOLF-
SON, R. PHILLIPS & T. Russo, REGULATION OF BROKERS, DEALERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS
2.08 (1977).
170. Geyer v. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis Inc., 389 F. Supp. 678 (D. Wyo. 1975)
(federal civil liability might be applied for violation of NYSE rule 405 or the NASD's suita-
bility rule in connection with the sale of Ginnie Maes). See also SEC v. Winters Gov't Sec.
Corp., No. 6345-CIV-JKL (S.D. Fla. 1977). In re Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., Exch. Act Release No. 11,515 (July 2, 1975).
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general principle that a dealer in securities has a legal obligation to
treat its customers fairly.
1 7'
The suitability doctrine would seem to have limited applicability
in the case of financial institutions with professional management,
who should know their investment objectives better than securities
dealers.1 72 Securities salesmen can hardly judge complicated asset
and liability policies of financial intermediaries. Moreover, the
agencies that regulate these institutions are better equipped with
the expertise to save the improvident institutions from themselves.
C. Regulation of Investors
Regulation of transactions by financial intermediaries in Ginnie
Maes has fallen into three categories. First, regulators have in
some instances promulgated arbitrary restrictions on certain forms
of transactions, frequently with reference to the permissible for-
ward period. Second, rituals such as board approval of written pol-
icies and procedures or legal opinions have been designed to
achieve involvement and monitoring by senior management of
these transactions. Finally, discipline has been provided by ac-
counting requirements that force current recognition of the impact
of forward transactions on the financial condition of the regulated
entity.
The federal bank regulators have each promulgated guidelines
concerning financial futures, forward placement contracts and
stand-by arrangements. The Comptroller of the Currency deems
use of these contracts an activity incidental to banking, although it
does not consider them "investment securities" within the meaning
171. See SECURITIES AND EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT OF SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES
MARKETS, H. Doc. No. 95, pt. 1, 88th Cong., Ist Sess. 238 (1964). See generally Charles
Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 436-37 (2d Cir. 1943), cert. denied, 321 U.S. 786 (1944).
Should this concept prove inadequate, the SEC might adopt a specific suitability rule cover-
ing non-registered broker-dealers under § 15(c)(i) of the Exchange Act.
172. See Utah State Univ. v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 168-69 (10th Cir.
1977); cf. § 2(15) of Securities Act, Small Business Investment Incentive Act of 1980, Pub.
L. No. 96-477, 94 Stat. 2275 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.) and Revision of
Certain Exemptions from Registration under the Securities Act of 1933 for Transactions
Involving Limited Offers and Sales, Sec. Act Release No. 6389 (Mar. 8, 1982) (concept of
accredited investors would eliminate need for subjective judgments about suitability of such
investors); see also R. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 284-87 (1982), where the au-
thor, a former SEC Commissioner, states that "the 'accredited investor' concept could well
be extended into other areas in order to provide for an exemption from the full protection of
the Securities Act for sophisticated investors who can fend for themselves." Id. at 286.
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of the Glass-Steagall Act. Concerning investment portfolio or non-
dealer obligations, national banks should only take positions that
reduce their overall risk exposure. The Banking Circular adopted
by the Comptroller also contemplates use of these devices as a gen-
eral hedge against interest-rate exposure from mismatches in inter-
est-sensitive assets and liabilities. Finally dealer activities in those
contracts should be in accordance with safe and sound banking
practices reasonably related to legally permitted trading activities.
Boards of directors should approve written policies and procedures
governing these activities and submit them to the Regional Admin-
istrator of National Banks. The policies should outline specifically
permitted strategies. Procedures should include systems that pro-
vide for effective surveillance by internal auditors and examiners,
monitoring of credit risk and appropriate internal controls, includ-
ing the establishment of trading limits. Banks are required
monthly to determine market value of open contracts and gener-
ally mark the contracts to market or the' lower of cost or market,
although futures and forward contracts used to hedge mortgage
banking operations may be accounted for in accordance with any
applicable generally accepted accounting principles. The Comp-
troller said that stand-by commitments for longer than 150 days
should not be issued unless warranted by special circumstances. '
The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation have promulgated guide-
lines for state member banks and insured state non-member banks
parallel to those of the Comptroller for national banks.174 In addi-
tion, these banks are directed to obtain an opinion of counsel or
the state banking authority concerning the legality of such
activities.
1 75
The accounting procedures set forth in these policy statements
173. Comptroller of the Currency Banking Circular 79 (Nov. 20, 1979; revised Mar. 19,
1980), National Bank Participation in the Financial Futures and Forward Placement Mar-
kets. The Banking Circular supersedes Banking Circular 79 (Nov. 2, 1976) and Supplement
thereto (Aug. 1, 1977).
174. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Policy Statement Concerning
Forward Placement or Delayed Delivery Contracts and Interest Rate Futures Contracts, 45
Fed. Reg. 18,120 (1980); Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Revised Policy Statement
Concerning Interest Rate Futures Contracts, Forward Contracts and Standby Contracts, 45
Fed. Reg. 18,116 (1980).
175. According to the Tri-Agency Study, however, few state regulators have taken ac-
tion in this area but have generally deferred to the federal regulatory agencies, Tmi-AGENCY
STUDY, supra note 13, at 203.
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reflect a general perception of regulators of financial institutions
that current accounting for the market action of covered contracts
will in itself provide a salutary discipline to the use of such con-
tracts. The reaction of regulated entities to the prospect of having
the chickens come back to roost quite so soon was apparently
strong,17 but the bank regulators were steadfast in insisting that
the accounting rules were necessary to prevent unsafe and unsound
banking practices.
The Federal Home Loan Bank Board also recognizes that specu-
lation in Ginnie Maes is not a proper activity for savings and loan
associations.1 77 It has adopted regulations applicable to institutions
insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
that prohibit adjusted trading, limit forward commitments and
specify accounting treatment of commitment fees. T17  Under the
regulations, commitment fees must be recorded pursuant to gener-
ally accepted accounting. principles. This means, according to the
Auditing and Accounting Guide for Savings and Loan Associations
issued by the AICPA, that such fees must be deferred and amor-
tized over the commitment and loan period to the extent of their
excess over underwriting costs. The regulations do not, unfortu-
nately, require current recognition of losses and gains relating to
forward contracts. 179 Forward commitments are limited both by a
prudence standard and by a percentage-of-assets ceiling. 80 The
boards of directors of covered institutions must approve and set
dollar limits on forward commitments with brokerage firms. 81 The
regulations also prescribe recordkeeping requirements for covered
176. See, e.g., Federal Reserve System Policy Statement, Supplementary Information,
45 Fed. Reg. 18,120-21 (1980); TI-AGENCY STUDY, supra note 13, at 182.
177. Federal Home Loan Bank Board Resolution No. 79-295, 44 Fed. Reg. 29,867
(1982).
178. 12 C.F.R. § 563.17-3 (1982).
179. The Bank Board was evidently intimidated by its regulated stable from taking
this most efficacious step toward dampening speculative spirits. The Bank Board has re-
cently raised this issue again, soliciting comments on mark-to-market accounting treatment
for forward commitments. Federal Home Loan Bank Board, Amendments on Forward Com-
mitments, Financial Options Trading, and Financial Futures Trading, 47 Fed. Reg. 9475
(1982)(amending 12 C.F.R. 563.17-3).
180. 12 C.F.R. § 563.17-3(c) (1982). See also proposed amendment that "would refine
further the current limitations on forward commitment activities." 47 Fed. Reg. 9475 (1982)
(amending 12 C.F.R. 563.17-3).




The National Credit Union Administration has restricted federal
credit union involvement in investment activities relating to Gin-
nie Maes which the administration believes to be unauthorized or
otherwise unsafe and unsound.'8 s The rule adopted by the admin-
istration prohibits stand-by commitments, adjusted trading, and
short sales; it limits the purchase and sale of securities, cash for-
wards, repurchase transactions, reverse repurchase transactions
and futures contracts."' Section 107(7) of the Federal Credit
Union Act 8 5 specifies the investments that federal credit unions
are authorized to make; such investments consist primarily of
loans to members and purchases of securities issued or guaranteed
by the federal government. The rule permits a federal credit union
to contract for the purchase or sale of an authorized security so
long as delivery is to be made within thirty days of the trade
date. 86 If delivery is to take longer than thirty days, the credit
union may forward contract if it has cash flow projections evidenc-
ing its ability to purchase the security. Moreover, all forward
agreements must be settled on a cash basis at settlement date. In
no event may the period between trade date and settlement date
exceed 120 days nor may the credit union sell a security forward
unless it owns the security. 87 In thus permitting forward agree-
ments, the administration stated that it was:
[C]ognizant of the steps taken by the securities industry to implement a
scheme of self-regulation of brokers and dealers engaged in the purchase or
sale of U.S. Government and Federal agency securities. Should the concept
of self-regulation not become a reality and abuses continue, the Administra-
tion will necessarily be required to reconsider its position in regard to per-
mitting cash forward agreements.'
Repurchase agreements are classified under the rule as invest-
182. Id. at para. (e).
183. 12 C.F.R. § 703.3 (1982). For a brief description of the limited responses to
problems in the markets for government-related securities by regulators of state-chartered
credit unions, see TRI-AGENCY STUDY, supra note 13, at 203-04.
184. 12 C.F.R. § 703.3 (1982). In LTV Fed. Credit Union v. UMIC Gov't Sec., Inc., 523
F. Supp. at 826-27, the court rejected the argument that Ginnie Mae stand-by commitments
were not permissible investments prior to adoption of the rule.
185. 12 U.S.C. § 1757(7) (Supp. IV 1980).
186. 12 C.F.R. § 703.3(b)(1) (1982).
187. 12 C.F.R. § 703.3(b)(3) (1982).
188. 44 Fed. Reg. 42,673-74 (1979).
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ment-type and loan-type. In order to qualify as an investment-type
repurchase transaction, ownership of the subject security must be
transferred without restriction to the credit union or its agent.' s8
All other repurchase agreements are loan-type repurchase transac-
tions.190 Section 107(5) of the Federal Credit Union Act 9' limits a
federal credit union's lending to its members, other credit unions
and credit union organizations. This restriction is deemed to apply
to loan-type repurchase transactions. 192 The rule includes a provi-
sion designed to preclude pyramiding and other speculative uses of
repurchase transactions.'
The rule prohibits any futures trading except in accordance with
specific authorization in a regulation not yet published by the ad-
ministration. 194 The administration has previously said: "Unless
the contract represents a bonafide hedging contract incident to the
assembly of a pool of mortgages for sale in the secondary market,
the transaction represents an investment which is separate and
apart from the underlying security. Therefore, federal credit un-
ions may not purchase a future since it is an investment not au-
thorized by section 107(7) of the Federal Credit Union Act.'
9 5
The administration subsequently established accounting proce-
dures for those investment activities permissible under its rule. 96
These procedures require, inter alia, that federal credit unions
mark to the lower of cost or market on settlement date any secur-
ity purchased pursuant to a forward contract and reflect the cur-
rent market value of their investment portfolios and outstanding
commitments in footnotes to their financial statements. Thus, like
the federal bank regulators but unlike the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, the Administration has taken the step that will effec-
189. 12 C.F.R. § 703.3(a)(4)(i) (1982).
190. 12 C.F.R. § 703.3(a)(4)(ii) (1982).
191. 12 U.S.C. § 1757(5) (Supp. IV 1980).
192. 12 C.F.R. § 703.3(b)(5) (1982).
193. 12 C.F.R. § 703.3(b)(6) (1982). The Administration had previously indicated con-
cern that federal credit unions had borrowed funds by means of repurchase agreements in
order to purchase new marketable securities, which in turn were used to borrow more funds
and purchase more securities. Memorandum dated August 18, 1977. Such pyramiding is in-
tended to result in a profit from the rise in the market price of the securities or, if the
market price remains stable, in increased income from the arbitrage.
194. 12 C.F.R. § 703.3(b)(7) (1982).
195. 43 Fed. Reg. 47,731-32 (1978) (codified at 12 C.F.R. 703.3(b)(2)).




tively focus prompt attention on speculative abuses and permit
timely regulatory reaction if needed.
As we discussed earlier; the SEC has instructed directors of reg-
istered investment companies to make adequate disclosure of the
risks of forwards, stand-bys and reverse repurchase agreements.
Specifically, the SEC said:
[D]isclosure materials should focus on . . . the potential risk of loss
presented to an investment company and its investors by those transac-
tions; the identification of the securities trading practices as separate and
distinct from the underlying securities; the differing investment goals inher-
ent in participating in the securities trading practices as compared to those
of investing in the underlying securities; and any other material information
relating to such practices and the investment company's participation
therein.
It also stated that an investment company significantly involved in
these trading practices that uses a name suggesting the existence
of a federal guarantee "may be using a deceptive or misleading
name within the meaning of Section 35(d) of the Act. '" '
D. Agency Studies
As pointed out above, the GNMA rules only cover issuers of Gin-
nie Maes, in keeping with GNMA's view of its jurisdictional
boundaries.19 Prior to adoption of the rules, GNMA commissioned
a study of approaches to regulation of market activities in Ginnie
Maes.2 ° In addition to recommending rules along the lines of those
subsequently adopted, the GNMA Report concluded that GNMA
should support efforts of the dealers to create a system of self-reg-
ulation. Until there is time to assess the efficacy of such a scheme,
the agency should oppose federal legislation and regulation of deal-
ers by the SEC or the CFTC. The self-regulatory scheme should
comprehend all trading in Ginnie Maes other than that already
regulated, and the self-regulatory organization should be open to
all dealers. This organization should be governed by a representa-
197. Securities Trading Practices of Registered Inv. Co., Inv. Co. Act Release No.
10,666 (Apr. 18, 1979).
198. Id.
199. 15 U.S.C. § 1723(a)(1976) authorizes GNMA to take such action as is "necessary
or incidental to the proper management of its affairs and the proper conduct of its
business."
200. GNMA REPORT, supra note 13.
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tive board of directors and be directed by a full-time staff member.
It should have disciplinary functions and an arbitration facility. If
the self-regulatory scheme is not realized, this report recom-
mended a regulatory agency similar to the Municipal Securities
Rule-Making Board (MSRB). Finally, the report suggested GNMA
encourage the direct regulators of participants in the Ginnie Mae
markets to deal with their particular problems.2"'
Two years later, the Department of the Treasury, the Federal
Reserve System and the SEC prepared a study of problems arising
in the government-related securities market, with special emphasis
on the forward market in Ginnie Maes.20 2 The Tri-Agency Study
recognized that actions by GNMA and federal regulators of
financial 4nstitutions had reduced the exposure of this market, but
nonetheless perceived the potential "for serious abuse . .. to re-
main unacceptably great. ' '20 3 In particular, the study expressed
concern about the lack of margin requirements and the attendant
risk caused by delayed delivery.20 4
Despite acknowledgement that the major source of problems in
the government-related securities markets is the lack of initial and
maintenance margin in forward transactions2"' and consideration
whether margin rules in themselves would be a sufficient form of
regulation,20 6 the study concluded that a plenary system of regula-
tion is appropriate.2 07 The study proposed creation of a self-regula-
tory organization, called the Federal Mortgage-Backed Securities
Rulemaking Board (FMBSRB), which would promulgate rules gov-
erning trading on a forward basis in mortgage-backed securities
guaranteed by GNMA or FHLMC. 20 8 The FMBSRB, which would
be made up of representatives of bank and non-bank securities
201. In response to a subsequent inquiry from Senator Williams, however, a GNMA
official indicated impatience with industry efforts toward self-regulation, mentioning
problems with implementing margin rules and compulsory membership. Letter from Fred
Taylor, Executive Vice President of GNMA, to Senator Williams (Aug. 31, 1979).
202. Tin-AGENCY STUDY, supra note 13.
203. Id. at 3.
204. Id. at 119-20, 122-24.
205. Id. at 211.
206. Id. at 205, 211 and 214-19.
207. Id. at 219.
208. Although the study saw no need to regulate cash transactions in GNMA or
FHLMC securities or transactions in other government-related securities, it proposed re-
serve authority for this purpose (except for Treasury securities), subject to unanimous ap-
proval by the oversight council. Id. at 6, 222-23.
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dealers and public representatives, would, most importantly, have
authority to set margin requirements for forward transactions, sub-
ject to residual rulemaking authority by the Federal Reserve
Board."0 9 It would also establish financial responsibility, fair prac-
tice and other rules, while the SEC would have anti-fraud
rulemaking authority. 10 The FMBSRB rulemaking authority
would be subject to oversight by a council consisting of the Secre-
tary of the Treasury, the Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board
and the Chairman of the SEC, or their designees.2" Brokers and
dealers, including banks, and clearing agencies involved in forward
trading GNMA and FHLMC securities would be subject to regis-
tration and oversight.212 Non-bank brokers and dealers would be
required to be members of the Securities Investors Protection Cor-
poration. The study proposes granting inspection and enforcement
authority to the NASD, national securities exchanges and federal
bank regulatory agencies with concurrent enforcement authority in
the SEC.
E. Congress
After expressing "grave doubt about whether the private sector
can successfully subject itself to unsupervised self-regulation in
any meaningful way, ' '2 1 3 Senator Williams introduced a bill, S.
2515, in April 1980 that would create a Government Securities
Rulemaking Board (GSRB), similar to the Municipal Securities
Rulemaking Board. The GSRB would set sales and trading prac-
tice rules and develop qualification standards for industry profes-
sionals. The SEC would appoint the initial members of the board
and oversee its activities. Inspection and enforcement of rules
adopted by the GSRB would be the responsibility of industry self-
regulatory organizations such as the NASD and the NYSE, bank-
ing agencies and the SEC. S. 2515 would require all government-
guaranteed securities dealers to register with the SEC. Initially
only the markets in Ginnie Maes and Freddie Macs would be cov-
ered; however, the bill would give the Secretary of the Treasury
209. Id. at 4-5, 224.
210. Id. at 5, 225-26.
211. Id. at 5, 221.
212. Id.
213. Letter from Senator Harrison A. Williams, Jr. to the Honorable Harold M. Wil-
liams, Chairman of the SEC (Apr. 17, 1979).
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authority to designate other government guaranteed securities
markets for federal oversight. The Federal Reserve Board would be
given margin authority for all transactions in the regulated mar-
kets. Senator Williams later introduced S. 3260, a bill entitled the
"Government-Related Securities Act of 1980" that was prepared
by the authors of the Tri-Agency Study and embodied its conclu-
sions. While S. 3260 and S. 2515 are similar and both would create
a self-regulatory rule-making board, S. 3260 contemplates multi-
agency oversight of the board.
The Department of Justice recommended that the Administra-
tion not support the bill because it was broader than necessary to
deal with the problem of lack of margin requirements identified by
the Tri-Agency Study and would result in excessive regulatory
costs that might discourage potential competitors from entering
the market.21 ' A Republican-controlled Senate and Administration
is likely to be similarly skeptical of these comprehensive schemes
of regulation as well as to give greater deference to self-regulatory
efforts.
VII. STATE REGULATION
Although we shall not here attempt to survey the state laws ap-
plicable to the kinds of abuses that have occurred in the trading
markets for Ginnie Maes, we shall briefly illustrate that traditional
state remedies may be brought to bear on perceived abuses in
these markets.
Ginnie Maes are themselves exempt from registration under
most state securities laws, although dealers in such securities ex-
clusively may have to register in some states and, as a result, be-
come subject to net capital and recordkeeping requirements. 21 5 It
has been contended in Arkansas, moreover, that forwards or stand-
bys require registration under state securities laws.216 In the same
state, the securities administrator has indicated that participation
by a broker-dealer in an adjusted trade where a purchasing
financial institution could defer recognition of a decrease in value
of securities would be considered violative of the state securities
214. Letter from Alan A. Parker, Assistant Attorney General, to James T. McIntyre,
Director, Office of Management and Budget (Oct. 1, 1980).
215. TRI-AGENCY STUDY, supra note 13, at 201-02.




In an egregious case a court might find that forward trading in
Ginnie Maes violates state laws designed to prevent gambling.218
Generally, a contract which neither party expects to consummate
by delivery but instead expects to liquidate by payment of the dif-
ference between the contract price and market price at the settle-
ment date is illegal and cannot be enforced. 19 First developed by
the courts, this principle has subsequently been embodied in state
"bucket shop" or anti-gaming statutes.220 These laws usually do
not apply to transactions on regulated commodity exchanges,2
and the courts are likely to be reluctant to introduce an element of
subjective uncertainty into the area of forward contracts in Ginnie
Maes. 2
Finally, in the regulation of insurance companies, where the
states enjoy exclusive jurisdiction, there is little evidence of rule-
making designed to deal with trading in Ginnie Maes or other gov-
ernment-related securities, although state insurance regulators
have comprehensive powers over investment policies of insurance
217. Memorandum from Arkansas Securities Administrator to Broker-Dealers regis-
tered in Arkansas (July 10, 1978). The substance of this memorandum was subsequently
incorporated in Rules of Ark. Sec. Dep't Rule 6.01(I) (Sept. 30, 1979).
218. GNMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 52-54.
219. See, e.g., Irwin v. Williar, 110 U.S. 499, 507-11 (1883); see generally 14 S. WnEis-
TON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 1665-81A (3d ed. 1972 & Supp. 1982); 6A A.
CoRBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 1493 (1962).
220. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 38, § 28-1(a)(4) (Smith-Hurd 1980); N.Y. GEN. Bus.
LAW § 351 (McKinney 1968). See generally Note, Legislation Affecting Commodity and
Stock Exchanges, 45 HAxv. L. Rav. 912 (1932). In a California case involving Ginnie Mae
forwards, plaintiff argued unsuccessfully that defendant had violated the state bucket shop
law. CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 29000-29201 (West 1977 & Supp. 1982). Progress Mortgage Corp. v.
Huntoon Paige & Co., No. C77 0534 CFP (N.D. Cal. 1977). Bucketing in that statute is
defined, inter alia, as
[m]aking or offering to make any contract respecting the purchase or sale of any se-
curities or commodities, wherein both parties do not intend, or such keeper does not
intend, the actual or bona fide receipt or delivery of the securities or commodities,
but do intend, or the keeper does intend, a settlement of the contract based upon the
differences in the public market quotations of prices at which the securities or com-
modities are or are asserted to be bought and sold.
CAL. CORP. CODE § 29008(c). Cf. Commodity Exchange Act, § 4b(D), 7 U.S.C. § 6b(D)
(1976).
221. See, e.g., Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 198 U.S. 236, 248-50
(1905); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-2028 (1975); cf. Paine, Webber, Jackson & Curtis, Inc. v.
Conaway, 515 F. Supp. 212 (N.D. Ala. 1981).
222. See LTV Fed. Credit Union v. UMIC Gov't Sec., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 819, 837-39
(N.D. Ala. 1981); cf. Kelly Cotton Merchant v. York, 494 F.2d 41 (5th Cir. 1974).
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The Mortgage-Backed Securities Dealers Association was
founded in 1972 as a trade association of members engaged in the
purchase, sale or origination of Ginnie Maes, including securities
firms, mortgage bankers and banks. In response to the concern
over speculative abuses, the Dealers Association evolved in the di-
rection of a self-regulatory organization. This movement was ulti-
mately subsumed by PSA Self-Regulation Inc. (PSA SRI), an en-
tity created by the Public Securities Association as an industry-
sponsored self-regulatory organization for dealers in government
mortgage-backed securities and guaranteed loans.225
In early 1978, the Dealers Association designed a program of
self-regulation, which included rules that would have required
dealer members to (i) conduct business in a fair and ethical man-
ner; (ii) follow uniform practices for processing, clearing and set-
tling trades; and (iii) impose margin-maintenance or mark-to-the-
market requirements. The latter rules required a member and its
customer to deposit collateral equal to an adverse change in the
market value of securities after the trade but prior to settlement if
the settlement date was more than four months from the trade
date. The program also included provisions for disciplinary pro-
ceedings and arbitration of member disputes.
The program was submitted to the United States Department of
Justice for antitrust review. While most elements passed muster,
the Department said the provisions dealing with margin mainte-
nance raised serious questions under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
The provisions could be viewed as "an agreement by Association
223. A few states have interpreted statutes requiring assets of an insurance company
to be held in its account to preclude futures and forward trading since delivery is delayed in
such trading. TRI-AGENCY STUDY, supra note 13, at 204.
224. Cf. PUBLIC SEC. ASS'N, REPORT ON THE GNMA SECuSrIIEs MARKET 19-22 (1978).
But see MICHIGAN DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BANK BULLETIN No. 24 (June 23, 1981) (guidelines
for bank participation in futures, forwards and stand-by contracts).
225. The Public Securities Association commissioned a study that concluded that
problems relating to sales and trading practices in the GNMA securities market could be
effectively addressed by the industry through the creation of an industry-sponsored self-




members to impose the same margin requirement on all parties to
the contract of sale for the securities regardless of their credit wor-
thiness and credit needs," thus eliminating that method of compe-
tition.226 The Department expressed similar concern about collec-
tive refusals to deal that "effectively foreclosed a firm from dealing
in mortgage-backed securities. ' 227 Notwithstanding these impor-
tant caveats, the basic program originally designed by the Dealers
Association was carried forward by PSA SRI, although without
margin-maintenance provisions.
PSA SRI was created, among other reasons, to "[dievelop and
promote high standards of business conduct among its members
* . .; [and] [aldopt standards of conduct and operation for mem-
bers and by lawful means secure and obtain compliance therewith
.... 228 Membership is open to all brokers and dealers in govern-
ment-guaranteed mortgage-backed securities and government-
guaranteed loan securities.22 Members must agree to abide by the
rules of the corporation, including disciplinary and arbitration
procedures.23 0
The board is comprised of representatives of banks and non-
bank brokers or dealers, who are diversified geographically as well
226. Letter from Donald L. Flexner, Acting Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Di-
vision, to counsel for the Mortgage-Backed Securities Dealers Association (June 25, 1979).
227. The Justice Department indicated that several rules read together could give rise
to the inference that members were prohibited from dealings with non-members not com-
plying with the Association's standards of conduct. Cf. Comments of Dep't of Justice, In re
National Futures Ass'n 11, 12 (July 2, 1981) (application to CFTC for registration as a self-
regulatory organization under § 17 of the Commodity Exchange Act), stating that:
The real impetus for NFA... appears to be the growth of non-exchange mem-
ber [Future Commission Merchants) and the belief that this class, currently unregu-
lated by the exchanges, requires compulsory self-regulation to protect the trading
public and the integrity of the industry. Whatever the merits of this argument - and
we note that empirical data to support any such inference are not in the Application
nor otherwise publicly available - we believe the argument cannot justify the Com-
mision's approval of NFA. Indeed, although its purpose may be laudable in the ab-
stract, in practice such an association might well undermine ... free and open com-
petition in the commodity futures industry.
Id. See also Comments of Dep't of Justice concerning the impact on competition in the
marketplace of an expanded role for commodity futures industry self-regulatory organiza-
tions. THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL, CoMPTRoLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS,
COMMODITY FUTURES REGULATION-CURRENT STATUS AND UNRESOLVED PROBLEMs, app. XVI
at 319 (1982).
228. PSA SELF REGULATION, INC., CERTIFICATE OF INCORPORATION, art. III (1979).
229. PSA SELF-REGULATION, INC., BY-LAws, art. II, § 1 (1979).
230. Id. § 2.
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as by size and type organization, and public representatives
"knowledgeable in regulatory, economic, business, legal, account-
ing, or other relevant matters. ' '2 3' The board is empowered to pro-
mulgate rules after providing an opportunity for comment to mem-
bers and other interested parties; adopt recordkeeping and audit
requirements and provide for examination and audits; adopt proce-
dures to determine whether to impose reasonable penalties for vio-
lations of the bylaws, rules or code of practice; and adopt an arbi-
tration procedure applicable to members and customers.
23 2
The Code of Fair Practice adopted by PSA SRI provides gener-
ally that members shall "deal fairly with all persons and shall not
engage in any deceptive, dishonest or unfair trade practice.
23 3




Rule 306 provides that a member must, after reasonable inquiry,
have reasonable grounds for believing that a transaction is suitable
for a customer based on facts furnished or disclosed by the cus-
tomer as to his financial ability and investment objectives and
needs and any similar information known to the member.3 5 If such
information is not disclosed, the member must have no reasonable
grounds for believing that the transaction is unsuitable for the cus-
tomer. The rule requires that members establish procedures for de-
termining suitability, including the financial capability and author-
ity of a customer to engage in transactions. Rule 304 prohibits
transactions with customers if the member believes or has reasona-
ble grounds to believe that such transactions violate laws, rules or
231. PSA SELF-REGULATION, INC., By-LAws, art. IV, § 1 (1979).
232. Id.
233. PSA SELF-REGULATION, INC., RULES RELATING TO TRANSACTIONS IN MORTGAGE-
BACKED SECURITIES, rule 301 (Jan. 1, 1980) [hereinafter cited as PSA SRI RULES].
234. While the rules have been approved by the membership, certain rules, including
those relating to supervision, the statement of risk and the code of arbitration have not
become effective and procedures for handling complaints against menibers have not yet
been established.
235. Rule 306 expressly prohibits transactions not deemed suitable for a customer.
PSA SRI RULES, supra note 233, at rule 306. Since the customer might nonetheless wish to
enter into an unsuitable transaction, it would be preferable, and less likely to be deemed




regulations applicable to the customers.2 36
B. Supervision
Members must supervise the activities of their personnel to en-
sure compliance with the rules and regulations of PSA SRI.2 37 In
particular, a person in a supervisory capacity should approve new
accounts and periodically review transactions with customers.
Members must adopt certain procedures for dealing with customer
complaints and for obtaining and verifying information concerning
their personnel.
C. Discount Overpricing
Members are not permitted to sell securities to a customer on
the basis of an assertion that the underlying mortgage pool will
pay down faster than is typical, unless the basis of such assertion
and'the potential risks inherent in the assumption are disclosed.2 38
D. Commitment Fees
Members cannot pay or receive a commitment fee in connection
with an agreement to buy or sell mortgage-backed securities away
from the current market price.2 39
E. Advertising
Advertising must not be false or misleading. Printed advertise-
ments must be filed with PSA SRI when first used.2" 0
F. Disclosure
At or before trade date for a delayed-delivery or stand-by con-
tract, a member should furnish to the customer a uniform disclo-
sure statement prepared by PSA SRI regarding the nature of the
236. Query whether published regulations put members on notice as to investment
restrictions of regulated entities? This seems unlikely, as members would then be required
to master myriad highly detailed regulations and interpretations applicable to their various
classes of customers.
237. PSA SRI RuLES, supra note 233, at rule 307.
238. Id. at rule 302.
239. Id. at rule 303. The rule provides an exception where the practice is permitted
under generally accepted accounting principles.
240. Id. at rule 305.
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risks in the transaction.241
G. Third-Party Deliveries
Transactions calling for delivery to a party other than the cus-
tomer or the customer's clearing agent or custodian are prohibited
if "the delivery is in connection with a financing of the transaction




PSA SRI has also promulgated rules and regulations to govern
recordkeeping and the mechanics of trading and selling transac-
tions in Ginnie Maes.
24
I. Financial Responsibility
Members of PSA SRI are required to have written procedures
for determining risk limits and periods for settlement. 244 These
procedures must include the "necessity and levels of any initial or
market maintenance margins required by the Member for each ac-
count," but do not prescribe any such requirements. A member
who does not mark contracts to market and require collateral in an
amount equal to any adverse change in market value, however,
must perform weekly credit reviews.24 While obviously not as effi-
cacious as mandatory margin maintenance, these provisions should
highlight the significance of responsible credit practices. 24" Dealers
who do not require margin under any circumstances could hardly
claim to be in compliance with the rule.
J. Arbitration, Surveillance, and Enforcement
Customers may submit disputes with members to binding arbi-
241. Id. at rule 308. The disclosure statement has been drafted but not yet adopted by
PSA SRI.
242. Id. at rule 309.
243. Id. at rules 201-206; see also PUBLIC SEC. Ass'N, UNIFORM PRACTICES FOR THE
CLEARANCE AND SETrLEMENT OF MORTGAGE-BACKED SECURITIES (1981).
244. PSA SRI RULES, supra note 233, at rule 401.
245. Id. at rule 402.
246. Rule 201 provides audit procedures that, inter alia, require assurance that a
dealer-member has maintained the requisite procedures. Id. at rule 201.
Vol. 21:39
Ginnie Maes
tration. 47 Any aggrieved person may also file a complaint against a
member based upon an act, practice or omission in violation of any
of the rules and regulations. Similarly, officers designated by the
board of directors may institute such a proceeding. "' In order to
investigate such complaints, the member may be required to an-
swer to any such charges and to furnish its books, records, ac-
counts and written procedures for inspection.
Even apart from the elimination of uniform mark-to-market re-
quirements, the rules and regulations promulgated by PSA SRI are
a weakened version of those submitted to the Justice Department
by the Dealers Association, perhaps in response to the antitrust
concern expressed about collective refusals to deal.' " Notwith-
standing their limited scope, however, PSA SRI has had limited
success in gaining members from the industry. 50 Conversations
with dealers suggest that they are not likely to give active support
to the self-regulatory organization unless they believe this will fend
off more direct governmental regulation or they see some other
advantage.
The industry should consider a link between membership in
PSA SRI and participation in the MBS Clearing Corporation as a
means of resolving the impasse over margin requirements. The
Tri-Agency Study suggests that:
[I]n addition to facilitating efficient settlement of trades, a clearing agency
might implement margin rules by (i) notifying its participants (presumably
mostly securities dealers) of their margin payment obligations on a daily
basis; (ii) monitoring their compliance with those obligations; (iii) acting as
a third-party escrow agent to hold the deposits; and (iv) taking into account
a participant's hedged or off-setting commitments to the extent that these
might reduce the participant's required margin payments. Depending on its
structure and powers, a clearing agency might also perform a market moni-
toring function, gathering information on market activity and perhaps iden-
tifying instances of over-commitments. 61
247. Id. at rule 501.
248. Id. at rule 503.
249. PSA's Executive Director, Arthur J. Kalita, told the author that liberalization of
those rules reflected recognition that the original version was simply unworkable in part.
Interview in New York City (June 10, 1981).
250. Thirty-one of the 60-80 active dealers had joined PSA SRI as of December 1980.
TRI-AGENCY STUDY, supra note 13, at 198 n.15.
251. Tmi-AGENCY STUDY, supra note 13, at 216-17. The study stated that "major ad-
vantages of clearing agencies can be realized through voluntary use of these mechanisms,"
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The competitive impact of any self-regulatory organization must
be considered carefully. The existence of such a vehicle tempts its
members to use the rubric of "high standards of business conduct"
to justify rules that operate to inhibit competition and stifle inno-
vation.28 The fundamental constraint of antitrust considerations
on self-regulation, 26  especially self-regulation unprotected by a
although it suggested governmental oversight to assure that any such clearing agencies "op-
erate fairly, efficiently, and safely, and that they produce the regulatory benefits that can
reasonably be expected of them." Id. at 217. The MBS Clearing Corporation, which utilizes
the Midwest Clearing Corporation as facilities manager, requires each participant to post by
means of cash, qualified securities or a letter of credit an amount equal to 100% of any
debit balance resulting from the daily mark-to-market of all forward commitments that
have been entered in the system by the participants. Id. at 81. Under the CBOE's proposed
scheme for trading options on Ginnie Maes, CBOE member firms transacting business in
these option contracts must be a clearing member or have a correspondent relationship with
a clearing member of the Options Clearing Corporation. CHICAGO BD. OPTIONS EXCH., A
MARKET IN OPr1ONs ON GNMA MODIFIED PASS-THROUGH SECURITIES (1980).
252. In an analogous context the Justice Department has argued cogently that:
[Tihe interplay of market forces provide the type and amount of goods and services
that consumers desire. This competitive principle not only applies to the allocatiop of
tangible goods and services, but also to less tangible aspects of trade, such as the
degree of risk that terms of a contract will not be fulfilled. The [Commodity Futures
Trading] Commission should regulate, or permit self-regulation, only where it can
identify a true failure of the marketplace to operate properly.
Comments of Dep't of Justice, supra note 227, at 16.
253. A refusal to deal based on violation of self-regulatory rules or policies may violate
the prohibitions against combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade of the Sherman
Act. See Vandervelde v. Put & Call Brokers & Dealers Ass'n, 344 F. Supp. 118 (S.D.N.Y.
1972). Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1, (1976) prohibits every contract, combi-
nation or conspiracy in restraint of trade; nonetheless courts have looked to the overall rea-
sonableness of certain activities, applying the rule of reason established in Standard Oil Co.
of New Jersey v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 59-60 (1911). Although group boycotts have
traditionally been included in the category of per se violations - those outside the purview
of the rule of reason, see, e.g., Fashion Originators Guild of Am. v. FTC, 312 U.S. 457, 467-
68 (1941), - the Supreme Court has carved out a limited exception. In Silver v. New York
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963), the Court indicated that a public policy of exchange self-
regulation suspends the per se rule so long as the activities in issue are carried out in fulfill-
ment of that policy. The Court somewhat cryptically suggested that the policy justifying
such activities could be derived otherwise than from a statute. Id. at 348-49; see also Cowen
v. New York Stock Exch., 371 F.2d 661, 664 (2d Cir. 1967) (challenge of exchange's discipli-
nary action); McCreery Angus Farms v. American Angus Ass'n, 379 F. Supp. 1008, 1017-18
(S.D. Ill. 1974), aff'd, 506 F.2d 1404 (7th Cir. 1974) (challenge by breeders suspended by
association for failure to observe blood-typing rule); Tropic Film Corp. v. Paramount Pic-
tures Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1247, 1253-54 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (challenge to motion picture associ-
ation's rating system); Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049, 1064
(C.D. Cal. 1971), enforced sub nom. Haywood v. NBA, 401 U.S. 1204 (1971) (challenge of
National Basketball Association's player draft rule); Special Committee on Commodities
Regulations, Antitrust Immunity Under the Commodity Exchange Act, 35 REC. A.B.N.Y.
233, 238-40 (1980). But see National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S.
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statutory umbrella, is critical to the maintenance of free markets.
IX. REGULATORY APPRAISAL
To be effective, regulation must reach issuers, dealers and inves-
tors. GNMA regulates issuers pursuant to its authority to "pre-
scribe .. .rules, regulations, or requirements governing the man-
ner in which its general business may be conducted [and] do all
things as are necessary or incidental to the proper management of
its affairs and the proper conduct of its business." 254 As we have
seen, the marketing abuses in respect of Ginnie Maes may be dealt
with adequately by existing law, particularly the anti-fraud provi-
sions of the federal securities laws. Moreover, many dealer partici-
pants are members of self-regulatory organizations that in varying
degrees monitor and place restrictions on their market activities.
In addition, PSA is taking tentative steps toward self-regulation of
679, 689-90 (1978), where the Supreme Court appears to be eschewing the interpretation of
Silver adopted by these courts. For a discussion of Professional Engineers, see Brunelle,
The Papilsky Rule and the Emerging Antitrust Dimensions of the Securities Exchange
Act, 9 SEc. REG. L.J. 50, 70-71 (1981). It has been argued that collective activities might be
"validated by a public policy in favor of collective action." Note, Trade Association Exclu-
sionary Practices: An Affirmative Role for the Rule of Reason, 66 COLUM. L. REv. 1486,
1499-1502 (1966). This policy might be inferred from authoritative statements from govern-
ment officials as well as other official pronouncements reflecting industry consensus. Id. at
1500. The legislative history of government support for official pronouncements in favor of
self-regulation of the Ginnie Mae markets, see, e.g., the GNMA REPORT, supra note 13, and
the TmI-AGENCY STUmY, supra note 13, could buttress the case for self-regulatory action.
Whether self-regulatory rules will pass antitrust muster will depend on their content, the
procedural safeguards to their enforcement and the judicial appraisal of whether long-run
competitive advantages outweigh short-term competitive restrictions. Self-regulatory efforts
to impose margin requirements without a statutory umbrella are more likely to run into the
per se rule, given the deep-seated judicial opposition to price fixing of any kind. See, e.g.,
Catalano, Inc. v. Target Sales, Inc., 446 U.S. 643, 648 (1980) (credit terms an inseparable
part of price).
The history of self-regulation in the securities industry is replete with antitrust ten-
sions. The NASD came into being in 1939 after passage of the Maloney Act, which was an
outgrowth of the codes of fair competition developed during the earlier Roosevelt adminis-
tration. These codes, the first effort to develop self-regulating organizations for the business
community, were declared unconstitutional in Schecter v. United States, 295 U.S. 495
(1935). Thereafter, in an attempt to maintain the self-regulatory atmosphere originally cre-
ated by the exchanges, the securities industry succeeded in passing the Maloney Act. As-
suming that the self-regulation organization's rules would not otherwise withstand antitrust
scrutiny, some form of government oversight would be necessary to immunize the SRO. See
Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422 U.S. 659, 685 (1975); United States v. National Ass'n
of Sec. Dealers, 422 U.S. 694, 729-30 (1975); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341
(1963).
254. 12 U.S.C. § 1723a(a) (1976).
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dealers, including those who may not be members of other self-
regulatory organizations. Finally, financial-intermediary partici-
pants in the market are generally regulated by government agen-
cies that have a special expertise in those participants' functions.
In light of the institutional character of the marketplace for Gin-
nie Maes and the variegated investment considerations and poli-
cies of the investor participants, it seems most appropriate for the
direct regulators of those participants to focus regulatory action on
the participants' particular circumstances. An overall regulatory
scheme such as that proposed by the Tri-Agency Study is by its
nature static and would not easily take cognizance of the special
attributes and considerations of the various classes of investor par-
ticipants. There is also risk of an overreaction to the problems of a
few institutions imposing artificial and burdensome restrictions on
many more. 5
As described above, the regulators of most classes of investors in
Ginnie Maes have taken significant steps toward regulating their
activities in this market place. As these regulators have become
more knowledgeable, they have drawn back from more extreme
forms of regulation' 5" and have deployed more sophisticated tech-
niques, such as imposing accounting rules that require specific dis-
closure in financial statements of unrealized gains and unrealized
losses on open forward contracts. 7 As accounting principles evolve
255. See Jacobsohn, Banks and Securities: The Regulatory Agencies Get Tougher, 6
SEc. RaO. L.J. 213, 225 (1978).
256. Compare Proposed Rules of the National Credit Union Admin., 43 Fed. Reg.
47,731 (proposed Oct. 17, 1978) with 12 C.F.R. § 703.3 (1982) (rules actually adopted).
257. See, e.g., National Credit Union Admin. Interpretive Ruling No. 79-4, 44 Fed.
Reg. 51,195 (1980); cf. ICHIGAN DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BANK BULL'IN No. 24 (June 23,
1981) (banks may account for futures and forward contracts on basis of current market or
lower of cost or market; must account for stand-by contracts on basis of lower of cost or
market); FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, DISCLOSURE OF INTEREST RATE FUTURES
CONTRACTS AND FORWARD AND STANDBY CONTRACTS (Exposure Draft; Nov. 14, 1980) (specific
disclosure of: (i) accounting policies followed for futures, forwards and stand-bys; (ii) con-
tract amounts and market values of all long and short positions; (iii) amounts of unrealized
gains and losses on open contracts; and (iv) net amount of unamortized gains or losses on
closed contracts). But cf. 12 C.F.R. § 563.17-4(g)(1982) (deferred accounting treatment for
interest-rate futures transactions of thrift institutions insured by the Federal Savings and
Loan Insurance Corporation). The Federal Home Loan Bank Board argued that mark-to-
market accounting of futures transactions entered into for hedging purposes "results in ac-
counting assymetry when the hedged transaction or position is not also marked to market,
distorts financial statements, and increases profit volatility .... " Federal Home Loan
Bank Board, Release No. 81-207, 46 Fed. Reg. 24,579 (1981). This approach would also serve
to conceal institutions' exposed positions and potential liabilities. Cf. Slater, The Mysteri-
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and are imposed that reflect currently the financial effect of unset-
tled transactions, the temptation to take risks is materially dimin-
ished. 258 Elegant in their simplicity, the impact of these accounting
principles is not generally appreciated. The resulting visibility will
operate as a curative discipline on non-regulated entities as well as
regulated financial institutions.
Thus governmental and self-regulatory agencies have had and
will continue to have an influence in shaping the marketplace, in-
hibiting the free-wheeling aspects of the early years. The extended
examination of problems in and regulatory schemes for the Ginnie
Mae markets has itself provided guidance and created salutary re-
sponses to trading abuses.2 59 The GNMA Report stated:
As any new market develops, there is always a 'break in' period. Because of
the very success of the Ginnie Mae, market problems were dramatic and
received much attention. The complexity of the instrument and the resul-
tant forward trading, with optional trades, sophisticated financing devices
and a parallel market in futures contracts, all served to mask some of the
riskier sales abuses.
... On balance, however, considering (a) the vast size of the Ginnie Mae
market, (b) the number of investors, and (c) the length of time that the
typical trade exists until settlement without margin or mark to market, the
ous Goings On at Golden West, AMERICAN BANKER, June 9, 1981, at 1, 20; Ehrbar, The
Mysteriously Profitable S & L, FORTUNE, June 29, 1981, at 94. In an analogous context, it
has been observed that "[h]ad the S&L's been on market value accounting all along, they
might never have gotten into the fix they are in now. They and the regulators would have
been forced to face the music long ago instead of letting things slide until the situation was
truly desperate." Carmichael, How S & Ls Can Hide Their Losses, FoRaEs, Oct. 26, 1981, at
187, 189. Contrast the approach taken by the three federal bank regulators and the National
Credit Union Administration described above in pt. VI.
258. In an analysis of financial futures markets, the CFTC has stated "the usual ac-
counting conventions used by depository institutions may contribute to excessive risk tak-
ing. With the exception of trading accounts of banker/dealers, depository institutions have
traditionally not used a 'current market value' accounting convention for the assets they
hold but instead have used an 'original cost' convention." CFTC, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
iN RESPONSE TO SFCTION 21 OF THE CoMMoDrrY EXCHANGE ACT, pt. m, 77 (May 29, 1981).
259. Sack, Creation of Board to Regulate GNMAs Remains Uncertain, The Daily
Bond Buyer 3, 25 (PSA Conference Supp. Nov. 13, 1980). Referring to Winters, No. 6345-
CIV-JKL (S.D. Fla. 1977), see supra text accompanying note 133, and Harwell, No. 78-1916
(S.D. Tex. 1978), see supra text accompanying notes 134-38, the GNMA Report states that
"these well publicized cases have resulted in major changes in the way Ginnie Mae dealers
have conducted their business, and have caused federal and state regulators to adopt rules
and procedures which have served to reduce or eliminate some inappropriate investment
and speculation in the Ginnie Mae market." GNMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 77.
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Ginnie Mae has had fewer problems than might have been anticipated."'0
The only significant regulatory lacuna would appear to be the
credit policies and financial responsibility of those dealers who are
not regulated at all, i.e., they deal exclusively in exempt securities
and thus do not have to be registered under the Exchange Act and
have not joined PSA SRI. If PSA SRI is unable to establish an
efficacious system of margin requirements because of antitrust im-
pediments, it may become necessary to remove those impediments
by legislation providing governmental oversight of a credit sys-
tem.26 1 It is neither necessary nor desirable, however, to extrapo-
late that function of governmental oversight into a comprehensive
- and, in this writer's view, redundant - system such as that pro-
posed by the Tri-Agency Study.262
260. GNMA REPORT, supra note 13, at 98.
261. See Tax-AGENCY STUDY, supra note 13, at 214-18. The Federal Reserve Board has
recently acted to permit national securities exchanges to set margin requirements in respect
of options on government-guaranteed debt securities. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.4(i), 220.8(b),(j)
(1982); see also Letter from Ralph C. Ferrara, General Counsel of the SEC, to Alphonse
D'Amato, Chairman, United States Senate Subcommittee on Securities (July 15, 1981).
262. Commenting on the legislative proposal of the Tri-Agency Study, the Department
of Justice stated:
[W]e are of the view that the draft bill is broader than necessary and entails excessive
regulatory costs.
.. . Since many of the abuses cited by the report largely flow from the absence
of margin requirements, regulation tailored to deal with the specific problem of mar-
gin requirements would appear to be sufficient to remedy the shortcomings. However,
the draft bill proposes broader federal regulation of the government-regulated securi-
ties market, including broad supervision of brokers and dealers in the designated se-
curities although regulation other than margin requirements could be handled effec-
tively by self-regulatory organizations within the industry . . . . Moreover, the SEC
already has authority to deal with fraudulent activities in these markets.
Letter from Alan A. Parker, Assistant Attorney General, to James T. McIntyre, Director,
Office of Management and Budget (Oct. 1, 1980).
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